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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2014, the Greek office of Amnesty International, issued a press release regarding 
the continuous deaths in the Mediterranean. Highlighting the plight of refugees and migrants 
attempting to reach European shores, it noted that in the Aegean Sea alone, from August 2012 
and until May of 2014 a total of 208 persons were estimated to have drowned or disappeared. In 
2011, which was the deadliest year for the Mediterranean crossing, 1,500 migrants died: 1 in 
every 50 migrants who crossed. For 2014 however, IOM's records of loss of life at sea are already 
exceedingly high; 3,000 migrants have died attempting to make the voyage to Europe, seeking 
entry via Italy, Greece, Malta and Spain.  
From the early 1990s until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the Southern Member States of the 
European Union-due to their geographical location and function as the external borders of the 
Union- have been on the receiving end of irregular arrivals. Resembling four interconnected 
vessels, Spain first, Italy second, Greece third and Malta last have seen their border controls 
tested with irregular arrivals from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel and as far 
away as Asia. The complexity of the arrivals cannot be underestimated. Irregular migration from 
the Mediterranean does not necessarily originate from the region or from the departure points. 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Afghanis cross the borders from Iran and enter Greece via Turkey. 
Libya was one of the main destination countries for labour migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, 
who following the Arab Spring and the fall of the Gadhafi regime fled to safety towards the 
European Union, from economic migrants becoming asylum seekers. Mauritania and Senegal 
have been since the late 2000’s transit points for entry to the Canary Islands for sub-Saharan 
Africans. West Africa remains one of the most important areas of emigration; however the 
majority of those who reach the EU have spent a significant time in transit or even worked for a 
period of time in countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Countries have acted at one time or 
another as destination areas and/or transit destinations. Those who also have external borders 
to the Mediterranean Sea are, by virtue of their geographical position, a logical destination to 
reach, since they act as the pathway to the other side of the Mediterranean1.  
Yet, migration challenges have reached an unprecedented level of complexity and scale in the 
last two years, raising once more the question of managing irregular migration at the external 
borders. The EU has consistently, since 1999, attempted to form policies and measures that in 
one way or another manage and effectively govern mobility towards and within the European 
Union. To this effort, the frontline states have played a critical role and adopted measures and 
policies throughout the years, attempting to curb arrivals and ensure return of the ‘undesirable’ 
population in the countries of origin. Greece is one of the frontline states experiencing for the 
past twenty years a continuous shift in its ‘migration landscape’, from a country of origin to a 
                                                          
1  Charef, M. (2004). Geographical situation as a facilitator of irregular migration in transit countries. Migrants in 
the transit countries: sharing responsibilities in management and protection, Istanbul, Council of Europe Conference: 41-
57.  
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country of destination and transit2. The country has attempted to strike a balance between its 
European and International legal and humanitarian obligations and its desire to manage its land 
and sea borders. Additionally, like all member states at the external borders of the Union, 
Greece has to contend with the Dublin III Regulation (recast June 2013) that allocates 
responsibility to the member state where the applicant first arrived (and/or was apprehended), 
following a set of objective criteria. The aim behind the Dublin Convention was to limit the 
movement of asylum seekers in transit in Europe and inhibit them from lodging their application 
in their country of preference. Having to overcome obstacles and restrictive policies, the migrant 
is stigmatized already as “illegal” and asylum becomes a game of chance depending on the 
member state the person has arrived in3.  
Irregular migration to Greece 
Geography has been a critical factor in shaping Greece’s immigration features. Situated at the 
‘soft underbelly’ of the EU, at the crossroads of Mediterranean migration routes from the South 
to the North , Greece has been a critical pathway of entry for migrants with two main entry 
points: the Greek-Albanian border to the North and the Greek-Turkish border to the East with 
migrants originating from Asia and Africa. Albanians constitute by far the largest migrant 
community, with migratory movements of Albanians to Greece throughout the 1990s being 
temporary, predominantly irregular and involving semi-skilled, low-skilled, or unskilled 
migrants4. However, gradually through the 2000s Albanian immigration to Greece became legal 
(mainly through repeated regularization programmes in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2007) and people 
settled in the country5.  
Since the mid-2000s irregular migration and asylum seeking pressures shifted east, to the Greek 
Turkish sea and land borders, accompanied by a shift in nationalities but also type of 
immigrants. Mixed migrant flows, encompassing irregular economic migrants, forced migrants 
and refugees, unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking, began arriving from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and sub-Saharan Africa. This placed a critical burden in a 
country already ill-equipped in dealing with unauthorized arrivals.  
The sea border was the main point of entry until 2010. Standard practice of interception both 
at the maritime and land borders included disembarkation, first aid and health checks, transfer 
to police station for identity checks (for those without documents) and detention, usually 
                                                          
2  Dimitriadi, A. (2013) “Transit migration to Greece: the case of Afghan, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants”, 
Nissos Publishing (in Greek).  
3  Triandafyllidou, A& Dimitriadi, A. & (2013) “Migration management at the Outposts of the EU: the case of 
Italy and Greece’s Borders”, Griffith Law Review, 22:3 Symposium Issue. 
4  Gemi, E. (2013), “Albanian Migration to Greece: a new typology of crisis”. Background Report, IRMA Project, 
Athens: ELIAMEP.  
5  Triandafyllidou, A. and Maroukis, T.(2010) (eds) ‘Immigration in Greece in the 21st century’, Kritiki, (in Greek). 
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followed by release and an administrative expulsion order requesting the migrant leaves 
voluntarily the country within 30 days. Migrants would usually move to Athens and from there 
disperse to urban and rural centres in search of jobs, or the harbors of Patra and Igoumenitsa in 
the hope of hiding in one of the ferries and cargo ships, heading to Italy. The volume of arrivals 
(see Table 1) was unmatched in terms of police and coastguard resources.  
 
Table 1: Apprehensions (all areas) 
 
Total 
apprehensions  
2008 2009 2010 
146.337 126.145 132.524 
 
Greece attempted to deal with the maritime arrivals through fencing and gate-keeping6. The 
country requested European assistance as early as 2006, when the first Joint Operation (JO) by 
Frontex7-code named Poseidon- took place. JO Poseidon has since become permanent and in 
2011 extended to include also Crete as well as the waters between Italy and Greece. Frontex’s 
presence in Greece solidified through the establishment of the Operational Office in Piraeus.  
On the diplomatic front, Greece signed in 2002 the Readmission Protocol with Turkey, the main 
transit country for irregular arrivals from Africa and Asia. Turkey, in practice, places geographical 
limitations to the Protocol, willing to accept only nationals of countries with direct borders to 
Turkey8. This automatically limited significantly the number of potential returnees, as is evident 
from the readmission requests and their acceptance rate by Turkey (see Table 2 below).  
                                                          
6  Triandafyllidou A and Ambrosini M. (2011) “Irregular Immigration Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing 
and Weak Gate-keeping serving the Labour Market”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 13 (3). 
7  European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, hereafter Frontex. 
8  Turkey in 2012 refused also to accept readmission requests for Syrian nationals, and despite a readmission 
protocol with Pakistan it also refuses to accept readmission requests for Pakistani nationals.   
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Table 2: Readmission requests Greece – Turkey 2010-2013 
Year Readmission Requests* 
Corresponding 
persons 
Accepted 
persons Executed Returns   
2010 295 10,198 1,457 501 
2011 276 18,758 1,552 730 
2012 292 20,464 823 113 
2013 24 436 78 8 
Total 5,686 122,437 12,326 3,805 
* Each request refers to several persons. 
 
Turkey’s overall reluctance to enforce the Protocol was part of a broader lack of cooperation in 
terms of border management between the two countries, which changed only recently. Limited 
implementation of the Readmission Protocol also meant that a significant portion of those who 
would be eligible for return to Turkey, had to be expelled directly to their countries of origin-
thus, necessitating the incorporation of migration management in the foreign policy domain, 
bilateral agreements and appropriate funding for the realisation of return flights (See section on 
Returns below).  
By 2010, the turning point in Greece’s migration management policy, the country was 
accounting for the majority of apprehensions at the external borders of the Union. Due to a 
variety of factors, from systematic patrols to Frontex operations but primarily due to the de-
mining of Evros, arrivals shifted to the Greek Turkish land border along the river Evros at the 
northeast corner of Greece. The shift was accompanied by a significant influx in arrivals that 
once more caught the Greek state unprepared.  The majority were arrested and detained with 
little screening or access to asylum. On September 21, 2010, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) declared the asylum situation in Greece a “humanitarian 
crisis” and stressed that Greece’s lack of a functioning asylum system had “important 
implications for the wider EU.”9 In a way, UNHCR’s outcry proved prophetic. The situation had 
grown unmanageable, to the detriment of migrants and especially asylum seekers. It also began 
to impact the European partners, who grew concerned with those migrants who succeeded in 
transiting to their territory from Greece. Furthermore the decision by the ECtHR on M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece10, led member states to suspend transfers under the Dublin II mechanism.  
                                                          
9  See UNHCR, “UNHCR Says Asylum Situation in Greece ‘A Humanitarian Crisis,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, 21 
September 2010, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c98a0ac9.html.  
10  European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Judgment of the Grand Chamber on the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece (Application No. 30696/09), 21 January 2011, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
103050. The Court found that the dysfunctions of the Greek asylum system and the inhuman and degrading conditions of 
Page  8 
 
 
Greece submitted on October 24th 2010 an official request to the European Union for further 
assistance, resulting in the deployment of RABIT teams11  for the first time on European soil and 
eventually replaced by an extended JO Poseidon land operation throughout 2011 that included 
the Greek-Bulgarian border.  Greece had to bear the brunt of arrivals, largely a result of Turkey’s 
visa liberalization regime, which made initial access to Turkey easier for transit populations, 
geopolitical tensions in the broader region and a successful-albeit temporary at the time- 
fencing of the Italian and Spanish borders. 
A ‘holistic’ management approach? 
The year 2010 was a milestone in the construction of a new approach to managing irregular 
migration and asylum. Greece, under pressure from member states but also international 
organizations and NGO’s, instituted a series of changes in its reception, screening and asylum 
processes. Added to this, a combination of deterrence measures, detention and expulsions 
meant that for the first time in almost 20 years the country made a conscious effort to institute a 
holistic approach in managing mixed irregular arrivals.  
The National Action Plan of 2010 drew from other EU Member States as well as Greece’s 
European and International obligations and proposed the creation of a new Asylum Service, an 
Appeals Committee (for rejected asylum applications) and a First Reception Service. The Asylum 
Service and the Appeals Committee would be autonomous and impartial, while the First 
Reception Service would be responsible for the ‘management’ of new arrivals, bringing together 
a team of ‘first contact points’ in the maritime and land borders. This was a radical and much 
needed change in the system. In the years up to June 2013, asylum was under the sole purview 
of the Hellenic Police and there was no reception service to accommodate and care for new 
arrivals. This meant that it was impossible to separate and identify people in need and/or 
protection at entry points. As regards access to asylum, migrants were asked to travel to Athens 
to the Asylum service headquarters (also known as “Petrou Ralli”) to submit their asylum claim. 
The endless queues and waiting conditions discouraged many. The First Instance degree (of 
asylum) was the responsibility of the Police and the majority of claims were rejected irrespective 
of country of origin and individual circumstances. This, in turn, transferred the burden on the 
appeal process, which suffered from similar systemic weaknesses.  
The end result was that when the new asylum service came into being, 45,000 pending 
applications were due examination. This dysfunctional system produced a contrast; on the one 
hand asylum became a way for many to temporarily legalize their stay in the country (as they 
were issued the pink card – a six month stay permit while awaiting for their case to be 
processed), and on the other hand, it discouraged those in need to access it effectively (because 
                                                                                                                                                                            
detention in the country violated articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention for Human Rights and deprived the 
asylum seeker of his right to an effective remedy, thereby challenging the per se assumption of safety. 
11  Rapid Border Intervention Teams, i.e. rapidly deployable border guards. 
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of too few asylum offices and insufficient resources dedicated to the service). In an effort to 
allow the new Asylum Service to operate properly, it was decided that the backlogged cases 
would remain under the Police purview and their respective appeals committees. Some 
applicants – at the time- had been waiting for over 5 years for a decision. 
The legislative changes were accompanied with measures targeting the border areas and the 
irregular population already in the country. It can be argued that Greece proceeded to 
implement more than ever before a migration management routed in the security approach. It 
tightened border controls through the Operation ‘Shield’ (Aspida) with the transfer of 1,800 
border guards along the Greek Turkish land border,  and it concluded the building of  a border 
fence across the 12.5 km land stretch used as the main entry point in the region of Evros. 
Furthermore it increased passport controls and upgraded technologically the harbours of Patra 
and Igoumenitsa (in western Greece) targeting transit migrants seeking to leave for Italy by ferry 
boat. In parallel, it pursued an aggressive internal policy of apprehension and detention; daily 
police patrols (operation ‘Xenios Zeus’) attempted to identify irregular migrants that were then 
detained pending expulsion.  
This ‘criminalisation’ of irregular migrants was reinforced through an extensive detention policy. 
Greece imposes by law the maximum time for detention, which is 18 months (prescribed in the 
Return Directive, under exceptional circumstances only) for both irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers. The policy of detention was originally conceived as an effective way to curb irregular 
migrants from indiscriminately lodging asylum claims as means of legalising their stay12. 
However, recent findings13 show that Afghan migrants are discouraged from applying for asylum, 
since they are informed that detention time starts once more from zero once they apply for 
asylum and until a final decision is reached on their application. If a detainee applies for asylum, 
he/she remains in the facility while the claim is processed. If the claim is rejected at 1st Instance 
and the applicant lodges an appeal, he/she remains in detention until a final decision is made. 
And if appeal is also negative, the applicant remains in detention until he/she is either forcefully 
expelled or ‘voluntarily’ requests to return to the country of origin.  
Detention however is not merely a way of criminalizing, punishing or deterring ‘bogus’ asylum 
claims. Rather it is perceived as the linchpin for the successful implementation of the main 
policy, which is return; voluntary, assisted voluntary or forced (expulsion). Return is increasingly 
becoming-along with deterrence (from the point of origin and/or transit)-a key EU policy in 
partnership with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Europe currently posits 
                                                          
12  See A. Triandafyllidou, D.Angeli, A.Dimitriadi (2014) Detention as Punishment:Can indefinite detention be 
Greece's main policy tool to manage its irregular migrant population?. MIDAS Policy Brief, www. 
http://www.eliamep.gr/en/migration/midas-policy-brief-detention-as-punishment-can-indefinite-detention-be-greeces-
main-policy-tool-to-manage-its-irregular-migrant-population/   
13  Interviews were conducted with Afghan migrants in detention, including recent arrivals from the maritime 
border, throughout October-December 2013 and March-July 2014, in the framework of the IRMA project 
(http://irma.eliamep.gr/).  
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returns (forced or voluntary) as a priority in the management of irregular migration and 
increasingly a link is highlighted between ‘voluntary and forced return and conceived of both as 
essential and legitimate tools of migration management’ (IOM/MPR, 2010: 31). The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has reiterated the importance of returns of 
irregular migrants, and ‘recognizes that many of these people will have to leave Europe and have 
a responsibility to do so. Some, however, may not be able to meet this obligation on their own 
and may need assistance’14. AVR(R) is thus depicted as responding to a pre-existing need.  
Until recently Greece had a poor record in returns, partly due to insufficient embassy 
collaborations and ‘bogus’ asylum claims that perpetuated one’s stay in the country (return 
cannot take place while an asylum claim is pending). In the past two years, there is instead a 
noticeable increase in expulsions and a strong promotion of voluntary return programs often in 
collaboration with IOM or operated by the Hellenic Police. According to a Frontex official, who 
requested anonymity, Greece went from having infrequent return flights to countries of origin 
and/or transit, to performing twice-a-month returns15. Simultaneously, the IOM voluntary 
return program was strengthened and within a period of two years (2010-2012) a total of 4,978 
had been returned to their country of origin with the support of the European Return Fund. 
Additional funding and support has come from various sources, including the European Return 
Fund, the EAA Grants and the United Kingdom Border Agency.  
It should, however, be noted that ‘voluntary’ return from the pre-departure detention facilities 
(currently five around the country), which was where one of the main recruitment for 
repatriation takes place, raises questions of sustainability. For those who opt to return home, 
rather than spend the 18-month maximum time in detention, repatriation is “voluntary” in the 
sense that it is the least worst of two bad options. We have, however, little data as of now to 
show how successful this type of return is; in relation to retaining the returnees in the country of 
origin.  
Apprehension, detention and return formed for the first time a rounded approach in tackling 
irregular migrant flows.  As the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution of 201316 
recognised, Greece enhanced border controls and adopted a policy of systematic detention of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers in order to stem the flow. While these policies reduced 
the arrivals from the Evros border, they transferred arrivals back to the Greek Turkish sea 
borders, along the Aegean islands. The islands of Lesvos, Samos and the Dodecanese are once 
again on the receiving end of irregular migrants, though with less dramatic numbers 
                                                          
14   Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1742 (2010). “Voluntary Return Programmes: an effective, humane and 
cost-effective mechanism for returning irregular migrants”. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.  
15  The interviewee refers to Return Flights operated by Greek police with funding from the European Return 
Fund. Interviewee requested anonymity. (Interview with Frontex official, recorded in Athens on January 2013). 
16  Parliamentary Assembly (2013), ‘Migration and Asylum: mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean’, 
Resolution 1918/2013, http://assembly.coe.int, 18/2/2013. 
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(approximately 3,000 apprehensions in 2012) but more ill-equipped initially than before to 
house and care for arrivals.   
Current Outlook 
The continuation of the Syrian crisis, the military conscription in Eritrea, the withdrawal of US 
troops from Afghanistan are some of the factors triggering a significant flow of irregular arrivals, 
this time via the much more perilous sea passage. Migrant arrivals by sea doubled in the first six 
months of 2014 to more than 25,000, according to Greek Coastguard , though this number only 
covers those apprehended at the border. Syrians rank first, followed by Afghans and sub-Saharan 
Africans. The flows are now much more mixed in terms of composition; women with children, 
unaccompanied minors, families and elderly members mean that the need for reception, care, 
proper screening and identification of vulnerabilities are even more urgent than before. Rough 
seas are frequent, especially in the summer time, carried by strong northerly winds, which 
means that many boats capsize.  
In contrast to the Italian authorities, the Greek Coastguard does not actively search for migrant 
vessels to offer assistance unless they capsize or issue a distress signal.  Twelve people died in 
January of 2014 when a boat carrying 28 migrants overturned while being towed at high speed 
by a coastguard vessel. Furthermore, the UNHCR has repeatedly voiced concerns over 
‘pushbacks’-a practice whereby migrant boats are towed back into Turkish territorial waters.  
The management of irregular arrivals is combined with the particularly heavy burden of the 
financial crisis. As a result, Greece has had to rely extensively on EU funds, in order to implement 
its immigration control policy.  
Yet, between the reality on the ground and the policies designed a question of efficiency 
emerges; how efficient are the policies in place and at what cost, financial, in terms of human 
resources and in terms of long term impact. The MIDAS project seeks to answer some of these 
issues, by empirically assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of current irregular migration 
control policies in Greece. Assessment, thus, takes place by ‘contrasting’ the expected outcomes 
with the overall costs of migration control policies.   
The MIDAS Inquiry 
Discussions on Greece's migration and asylum policies have in recent years primarily taken place 
from a human rights perspective. Illegal pushbacks along the Greek-Turkish coastline, overnight 
refoulements across the Evros river, grimy detention centres and violence that went 
unpunished17 dominated the discourse on Greece's practices towards irregular migrants. A 
                                                          
17 Among the many reports see: Proasyl and the Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees 
(Athens),  “The truth may be bitter, but it must be told”, 2007; Human Rights Watch, “No Refuge: Migrans in Greece”, 
2009; Medecins sans Frontieres,“The invisible suffering of Migrants detained in Greece”, 2014  
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public statement by the Committee on the Prevention of Torture and a series of convicting 
judgments by the European Court of Human Rights18 provided fertile ground for the 
development of a discourse that focused on the inhuman side of Greece's migration policy. 
Through this humanitarian lens, effective migration management means effective protection of 
human rights.  
There is little doubt that Greece has in recent years struggled to adequately respond to an 
admittedly large influx of irregular arrivals. Yet while ample has been written on Greece's 
apparent difficulty in treating third country nationals with respect, less attention has been paid 
to the financial considerations steering Greece's practices. Little is known for instance on 
national expenditures and available budget.  
The authorities have at times provided figures, such as the recent announcement by the 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine that sea patrols in the Aegean are expected to cost 76 million 
euros in 2014.19 Yet in the absence of the wider context, these figures are of little use to the 
current discourse. Even less is known on the exact distribution of the available resources takes 
place. On the one hand, Greece seems unable to financially sustain an effective asylum system. 
Already in its first year of operation, 2013-2014, the new Asylum Service has had to also rely on 
voluntary work and assistance by UNHCR to cover its needs for interpreters.20 The country also 
has trouble providing adequate shelters for unaccompanied minors, as a result of which many 
are left to survive in destitution and homelessness.21  
On the other hand, millions of euros were set aside to erect the 12-km fence along the Greek-
Turkish border. Resources were also found to cover the running costs of Amygdaleza pre-removal 
centre, an 'exemplary' detention facility which costs 10,5 million per year.22 In many respects, 
                                                          
18  See S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, Appl. no. 12186/08, 
Judgment of 22 July 2010; Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 26 November 2009; Rahimi v. Greece, Appl. 
No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011; R. U. v. Greece, Appl. no. 2237/08, Judgment of 7 June 2011 
19  Data provided by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine aduring Press Conference, 04 September 2014; see also  
R. Maltezou and D. Kyvrikosaios, “Greece says in 'danger zone' from influx of Syrian, Iraqi Refugees”, 4 September 2014, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/greece-immigration-idUSL5N0R516420140904 ; see also the 
rather evasive answer concerning the costs of running Amygdaleza Pre-removal centre, Minister of Citizen Protection, 
Parliamentary Reply of 3 February 2014, available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-
ad6a-476a34d732bd/8341922.pdf;  see also staement by Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Discussion of 22 
October 2012, p.2934,  available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-
09f4c564609d/es20121022.pdf  
20  See G. Palaiologos, “Assistance in a Language Migrants can understand”, Kathimerini newspaper, 27 July 
2013,   http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite6_1_13/08/2013_513995  
21  See S. Troller, “Left to Survive: Systematic Failure to Protect Unaccompanied Minor Children in Greece”, 
Human Rights Watch, 2008, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/12/22/left-survive 
22 See A. Triandafyllidou and D. Angeli, “Is the indiscriminate detention of irregular migrants a cost-effective 
policy tool? The case-study of Amygdaleza Pre-Removal Centre”, Midas Policy Brief, May 2014, available at 
http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Policy-brief_the-case-study-of-Amygdaleza-1.pdf  
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the outcomes of Greece's investments are unsettling and nourish further the human rights 
discourse with which they are intertwined. 
Within this wider debate, the MIDAS project seeks to contribute to the existing discussions by 
evaluating for the first the time the Greek policies through the lens of their cost-effectiveness. 
By measuring the human and material resources invested in the management of irregular 
migration within the time frame of 2008-2013, the MIDAS project discusses three crucial 
questions: 
1. How much do irregular migration control policies in Greece actually cost? 
2. Are current policies cost-effective, when compared against their outputs and outcomes? 
3. Are there any alternative policy recommendations that could be more cost-effective? 
The MIDAS project aspires to further discussions on irregular migration policies at both the 
national and wider EU- level by sharing new knowledge and expanding the debate. The project 
constitutes the first major effort to bring together the diverse operational measures 
undertaken by Greece to manage irregular migration within the period 2008-2013; it is the first 
major initiative to calculate the actual cost of these policies, feeding new data to the present 
debate. Finally, it opens the floor for a broader discussion by providing its own review of 
Greece's migration policy through a new lens, that of cost-effectiveness.  
Methodology 
MIDAS is a 10-month project carried out by the ELIAMEP Migration Team between January-
October 2014. Research-wise it focuses on the period from 2008 to 2013, when a significant 
number of policy changes took place. 
In the absence of previous studies on the cost-effectiveness of Greece' migration policy, much 
time and energy was spent to gather information that were fragmented or simply unavailable. 
Once all main funding schemes of Greece's migration policy had been identified, we contacted 
all of Greece's main sponsors to gather the necessary data and at a second level, discuss the 
outcomes with key stakeholders. We worked primarily on the basis of written requests for 
information (and follow up interviews), in order to secure the accuracy of the figures provided. 
These were normally divided as follows: (a) cataloguing (list of operations/measures undertaken 
in the period 2008-2013), (b) costs (human and material resources deployed, expenditures), 
(c)direct outputs and outcomes (statistics on detainees, asylum claims, returns, apprehensions) 
and (d) evaluation (questions addressing effectiveness of measures against costs and in the 
overall Greek context).  
In terms of our sources, stakeholders at both a national and European level were contacted, with 
the understanding that Greece's migration management of the period 2008-2013 was not only 
the outcome of national policy-making but also in line with the EU approach towards irregular 
migration. At a national level the primary contact reference was the Police Headquarters of the 
Ministry of Citizens Protection and in particular the Aliens Directorate, Department of Migration 
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and Administrative Measures. We are particularly grateful for their assistance, which they readily 
offered and their excellent collaboration throughout the course of this project. We are also 
particularly grateful to UNHCR Athens for their time and overall contribution. IOM Athens, 
Medecins sans Frontieres and the Director of NGO Praxis also readily offered their assistance for 
which we are grateful. Correspondence was also undertaken with the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare, the new Asylum Service, the First Reception Service the Frontex Office in Piraeus, 
the Head of Amygdaleza Pre-Removal Centre, the Head of Elliniko Special Holding Facility and 
the Head of the Central Special Holding Facility (Petrou Ralli). We are thankful for the assistance 
and information they offered us.  At an international level, contact was assumed with the 
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) in relation to the EEA Grants in Greece which 
promptly provided us with the requested information, the Warsaw Frontex Heaquarters and the 
DG Home Affairs of the European Commission.  
In the context of our fieldwork we also visited three of Greece's largest detention centres: 
Amygdaleza Pre-Removal Centre, Elliniko Special Holding Aliens Facility, Central (Petrou Ralli) 
Special Holding Facility.  In addition to fieldwork, an extended overview of primary sources was 
undertaken:  Parliamentary questions, Greece's annual reports before the European Refugee 
Fund, the European Return Fund and the External Borders Fund, Frontex' financial reports, the 
EEA Grants Memorandum and other EU documents. 
The MIDAS project gathered and brought together a wide range of data and sought to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the overall expenditures entailed in managing irregular migration in 
Greece. In terms of analysis, its ambition is rather modest. We do not go as far as challenging 
Greece's, and consequently the EU's policy objectives on irregular migration management; 
rather, the aim has been from the beginning to take as a granted the current policy objectives 
and review the manner in which the authorities seek to achieve them.  Thus, the MIDAS 
project solely explores the financial dimension of the Greek migration policy and seeks to put 
forward policy recommendations in line with international human rights law that will benefit 
both migrants and the host society. Methodologically, this entails cataloguing the existing 
measures/operations/establishments, calculating their cost (where possible) and analysing their 
effectiveness by focusing on direct costs against long-term and short-term outputs and 
outcomes. Direct costs include the budget of each operational intervention and salaries of police 
officers, among others.  
One of our main objectives was to open a new strand of discussion and offer new information 
and analysis to ‘feed’ the debate on the management of irregular migration, and its cost. We 
hope this will prove a useful starting point and basis for future research in this field. 
  
Contents of the Report 
The first chapter outlines Greece's main strategy to tackle irregular migration during the period 
2008-2013 as well as the main sources, from which Greece has been financing its policies. The 
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information gathered framed the discussion and at the same time confirmed that the financial 
support of Member States has been instrumental in shaping Greece’s irregular migration policy.  
The second chapter turns to border control and apprehension policies. In the course of 2008-
2013 the Greek authorities applied an Integrated Border Management policy, by reinforcing 
Greece’s external borders through human and material resources aiming to send a strong and 
symbolic message that the country does not have an open-doors policy. At the same time, 
extensive round-up operations in the interior have sought to act as the counterpart to border 
operations, by “clearing up” the interior from the irregular migrant population. While in 
absolute numbers this policing system appears effective, in relative numbers the outputs have 
been rather mediocre. 
The third chapter is dedicated to the second pillar of Greece’s policy framework, namely that of 
detention. The latter is becoming the flagship of Greece’s current migration management, 
strongly linked with return. Over the period 2008-2013, Greece was the biggest beneficiary of 
the Return Fund, receiving around EUR 125 M plus almost EUR 5 M in emergency funding. 50% 
of this allocation was earmarked for the implementation of actual returns and approximately 32 
% for costs related to detention facility in order to improve their conditions23. Detention, in fact, 
has proven to be a particularly costly enterprise.  
Examining this linkage, the fourth chapter turns to return, voluntary and forced, as the main 
means of reducing Greece’s irregular migrant population. Voluntary return seems to hold the 
key to an effective migration management.  
Drawing from the above, the final chapter concludes with a review and summary of the policy 
recommendations with a view to better distributing resources and enhancing effectiveness. 
                                                          
23  Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan on 
Asylum and Migration Management, 7 October 2014, SWD (2014) 316, p.14 
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CHAPTER 1: GREECE'S POLICY AND ITS MAIN SPONSORS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION CONTROL  
 
There are several steps in assessing the cost-effectiveness of a policy. The first, most crucial, is to 
define who the target population is, since the cost-effectiveness of an intervention may vary 
according to the individuals it focuses on. In the context of irregular migration management, this 
is a challenge in itself, since the term 'irregular migrant' is ambiguous and often eludes statistical 
measurements.24  
In the context of the Greek policy framework, an irregular migrant is a third country national 
that enters, stays or resides within the Greek territory without the necessary legal 
requirements;25 the irregular migrant is thereby distinguished from an asylum-seeker who is 
entitled to cross the Greek borders. In the framework of the present study, the target population 
comprises of third country nationals that entered Greece without the necessary legal permission 
from 2008-2013, as well as those who stayed in the country without a valid residence permit. 
Asylum-seekers are at times indirectly addressed, but in reality they are an exception to the rule. 
26 As regards the size of the target population, according to a recent estimate provided by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Migration in 2013, there are at least 470,000 irregular migrants 
currently present in Greece.27 As this figure has not been challenged by the Greek authorities, it 
will be used as a reference in this study.  
The second step within a cost-effectiveness analysis is to identify the objectives of the policy. 
These may be short- and long-term. Once they have been defined, it is then possible to 
determine the measures adopted to implement them and assess their effectiveness against their 
                                                          
24 For a brief discussion see B. Vallmar, “Irregular Migration in the UK: Definition, Pathways and Scale”, Migration 
Observatory  Briefing,  COMPAS, University of Oxford, July 2011, available at 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Briefing%20-%20Irregular%20Migration_0.pdf ; for a 
comparative compilation on the definition of an irregular migrant used by different EU Member States see European 
Migration Network, “Ad-Hoc Query on national definitions of irregular migrants and available data” requested by GHK-
COWI on 1st March 2011 and produced on 21st November 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/298.emn_ad-
hoc_query_irregular_migration_updated_wider_dissemination_en.pdf  
25 See in particular Article 5,   Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0562&from=EN ; See Law 3386/2005 in force until 4 June 2014, when Greece's 
new Migration Code entered into force; see also the New Migration Code, in particular Articles 2 - 6 
26 Contrary to irregular migrants, asylum seekers are entitled to enter and stay in the country. In practice, 
however, access to the asylum system is limited. As a result an asylum-seeker may remain on an illegal status for many 
years and be treated as an irregular migrant by the authorities. See UNHCR – Office in Greece, “Contribution to the 
Dialogue on Migration and Asylum”, 2012, available at 
https://www.unhcr.gr/fileadmin/Greece/News/2012/positions/2012_Migration___Asylum_EN.pdf  
27 See UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, “Report: Mission to Greece”, 18 April 2013, p. 5, 
par. 9, available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/46/Add.4  
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costs.  In terms of irregular migration management, during the period 2008-2013, both practice 
and political promulgations agree that the ultimate goal was to reduce the size of the irregular 
migrant population. On this basis, the Greek authorities designed their policies along two main 
intertwined objectives: deterrence and return. To achieve this objective, Greece designed a 
three-pillar policy, outlined below: 
 
Figure 1. Greece's irregular migration strategy 
 
  
In 2010 Greece designed a National Action plan, which was revised in 2013. The Plan foresaw a 
series of reception and integration policies in the context of asylum and migration management. 
Nonetheless, not all of the policies were prioritised in the period 2008-2013. Both in terms of 
resource distribution and implementation pace, most of these measures are still in the making 
or in search for funding.  In terms of short- and long-term aims, Greece's policy approach sought 
to achieve both objectives of deterrence and return in an integrated manner. In the short term, 
border management aimed primarily at stopping migrants from entering the country. 
Apprehensions at the borders and the interior aimed at detecting ‘trespassers’ with a view to 
immediately return them. Detention was seen as a tool to facilitate returns, in turn made 
possible through apprehension. In the long run, the aim appears to be to deter migrants from 
entering Greece altogether.  
As aforementioned, the focus here will be on the direct costs of each policy measure and in 
particular on the national resources consumed and external funding mechanisms that were 
deployed in order to pay Greece's irregular migration policy.  
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The cost and Greece's main sponsors 
In the period 2008-2013, Greece's asylum and migration control policy entailed expenditures of 
at least half a billion euros.28 To cover the costs, the country relied not only on its national 
resources, but primarily on four external sponsors that co-funded Greece's policies at a 75%-
100% rate. These were the following:  
• European Commission (SOLID Framework) 
• Frontex 
• Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland in agreement with the European Commission (EEA 
Grants Framework) 
• United Kingdom Border Agency29 
This external contribution is of significance, in both political and financial terms. At a financial 
level, it allowed Greece to pursue its national action plan on migration and asylum. At a political 
level, the implications were two fold; On the one hand, a more concrete national policy on 
migration and asylum was formed. On the other hand, Greece's practices, though at times 
controversial, were largely in line with EU aims and objectives as they were approved both by 
European Council and Commission.  
 
EU Commission: “SOLID” Framework Program, 2008-2013 
In the period 2008-2013, the main sponsor of Greece's asylum and migration policy was the 
European Commission, through the “SOLID” Framework Programme (funding period 2007-
2013). Greece effectively started making use of all financial possibilities of the program from 
2008 onwards. With a generous support of EUR 386 million the Commission covered 
approximately two thirds of the overall irregular migration control and asylum management 
expenditure of Greece (estimated at half a billion for the 5-year period as we explain below in 
detail).  
The idea behind the SOLID Framework Program was to provide financial assistance to those EU 
Member States that were disproportionally burdened with implementing the EU's common 
asylum and migration policy. The EU Council acknowledged that policies required adequate 
resources. The equal application of the EU's common standards needed, therefore, to take place 
                                                          
28 See ‘Conclusions’ section p.22. 
29 The financial contribution of UKBA is not known. However during 2012-2014 it provided funding to IOM to 
operate 682 voluntary returns, i.e. 3% of its overall work. Data provided during IOM meeting on 2 June 2014 
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in the context of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities among EU Member States; in 
particular when interventions by one State benefitted the Community as a whole.30  
To this purpose, four financial solidarity mechanisms (Funds) were established:31 
- The External Borders Fund, which supported actions of border control and 
surveillance. It acted in complementarity with the FRONTEX Agency; 
- The European Returns Fund, which aimed at returning and reintegrating irregular 
migrants to their home countries; 
- The European Refugee Fund, which focuses on the reception of refugees as well as 
access to fair and effective asylum procedures; 
- The European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals, for the social, civic 
and cultural integration of third country nationals residing legally in European 
societies.  
The overall amount set aside for 2007-2013 was 4 billion euros, less than 1% of Europe's Multi-
annual Financial Framework.32During this period, almost all Member States utilized all four 
funds,33 with funding was at a maximum 75% rate.  
 
                                                          
30 See Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of 10 May 2005 – The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for 
European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice”, [COM(2005) 184 final – Official Journal C 236, 24 
September 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.htm  
31  See Commission of the EUropean Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the 
period 2007-2013”, {SEC(2005) 435} /* COM/2005/0123 final, Brussels, 6 April 2005, available at  
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0123&rid=1  
32  See European Parliamentary Research Service, “EU Funds for asylum, migration and borders”, 11 February 
2014, p. 4, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130663/LDM_BRI(2014)130663_REV1_EN.pdf 
33 See European Commission DG Home Affairs, “Asylum, Migration, Integration”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/index_en.htm; only Denmark has 
used solely the External Borders Fund, see European Commission DG Home Affairs, “Asylum, Migration, Integration: Fund 
Map” available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/mapping-
funds/countries/denmark/index_en.htm  
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Table 3. SOLID Framework Program Period 2007-2013 
External Borders Fund Return Fund Refugee Fund Integration Fund 
1,820 million 676 million 630 million 825 million 
 
Allocation was decided on the basis of primarily quantitative criteria (i.e. flow of migrants, size of 
target population, baseline situation, and development). Implementation of the funds took 
place on the basis of national annual programs as well as emergency assistance. 
The financial and political significance of the SOLID Framework in Greece's migration policy-
making 
From 2008-2013 Greece was allocated approximately EUR 200 million under the External 
Borders,  EUR 130 million from the Return Fund and a total of EUR 56 million from the Refugee 
Fund.  The financial assistance was offered via annual programs and emergency funding.  
According to European statistics, Greece was the 3rd top recipient of the External Borders Fund, 
(after Germany and Spain), the 1st top recipient of the Returns Fund, (followed by the United 
Kingdom and France) and the 8th top recipient of the European Refugee Fund.34  
 
Table 4a. Annual Funding allocated to Greece, SOLID Framework 2008-2013 
Year External Borders Fund  European Return Fund European Refugee Fund 
2008 13,743,088.85 5,379,392.57 1,571,280.36 
2009 23,459,507.84 7,497,847.41 3,313,487.88 
2010 27,448,280.54 14,389,434.00 4,832,783.63 
2011 40,919,759.87 24,975,339.68 5,042,269.27 
2012 44,745,804.00 37,357,613.00 4,015,377.00 
2013 44,033,646.00 35,544,340.00 3,163,323.00 
TOTAL €194,350,087.1 €125,143,966.66 €21,938,521.14 
Source: SOLID Framework, Funding map available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/mapping-funds/index_en.htm  
 
                                                          
34 See  European Commission DG Home Affairs, “Asylum, Migration, Integration”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/index_en.htm; see also Commission 
Staff Working Document, 2014, fn 23 
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Table 4b. Emergency Funding – SOLID Framework, 2008-2013 
External Borders Fund  Return Fund European Refugee Fund 
5 million 5 million 34 million 
*Source: Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Greek 
Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management, 2014  
 
In terms of the absorption of the Funds, Greece’s rate had some serious fluctuations (at its 
lowest 43%)35, but since 2011 it has been relatively high, with an average rate of over 85%.36  
In order to draw funding from each instrument, Greece had to prepare a multi-annual national 
program, setting out the strategy to achieve the objectives of the EU's common policy, 
accompanied by a draft financial plan. This was then sent to the Commission for approval. 
Greece was largely free to select its projects and the way they would be carried out, as long as 
they were intrinsically linked to the common standards, or sought to bring collective benefits 
at an EU level.37 Once approved, funding was released on an annual basis. Additional funding 
could be provided in emergency situations.   
The cooperation between Greece and the Commission has largely been fruitful. The most well-
known disagreement was the Commission's refusal to participate, through the External Borders 
Fund, in the erection of the fence along the Greek-Turkish Border; an undertaking it publicly 
renounced as “pointless”.38 In response, the Greek authorities accused the Commission of 
hypocrisy.39  What is important to note, however, is that from a financial and political 
perspective, Greece's irregular migration control practices are in many respects the direct 
product of the EU's common policy approach.   
 
                                                          
35  See Commission Staff Working Document, 2014, p. 18, fn 23 
36 See Ministry of Citizen Protection, Statement  , 9 March 2011, 
http://www.minocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=&perform=view&id=3542&Itemid=497 ; see also 
Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan on Asylum and 
Migration management, 2014, fn 23 which noted that until 2010 only 43% of the EBF allocation was actually absorbed, p. 
18 
37 See Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the 
period 2007-2013”, COM/2005/0123 final , 6 April 2005,  available at   http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0123  
38 See “Minister in EU row over fence”, 7 February 2012, available at 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_07/02/2012_426615 
39 Ibid.  
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Frontex 
The second major sponsor of Greece’s irregular migration control policies in the period 2008-
2013, was Frontex. Established in 2004 by the European Council40, Frontex was destined to act as 
a specialized expert body that would co-ordinate Member States in the field of external border 
management. While the primary responsibility for control and surveillance at the external 
borders would continue to lie with each Member State, Frontex would facilitate co-operation. 
Through this role, Frontex was mandated to undertake a wide range of activities and co-finance 
certain operations and projects.41  
The financial contribution provided by Frontex is not known. During the period 2008-2013, 
Greece appears to have been awarded a total of EUR 26,585,074 in Frontex grants42, with the 
biggest share allocated for the protection of the sea border. However, compared to the support 
of the Commission, Frontex’s financial assistance has been significantly more modest. For 
instance, in 2013, Frontex' direct contribution covered according to the Ministry of Mercantile 
Marine only 4,7% of Greece’s annual expenditures to manage its external sea borders.43 
Additionally to these direct grants, Frontex has provided indirect financial contribution to 
Greece, by means of operational assistance and capacity building. In terms of size and cost, the 
most expensive undertaking has been the Poseidon Project; reportedly, Frontex’ biggest 
operational activity thus far44. Poseidon is a joint operation program, which has been running 
continuously since 2008, extended today to cover both Greek land and sea borders. If we take 
into account the grants awarded to all EU Member States in the context of this operation, then 
the Poseidon Land and Poseidon Sea appear to have cost about EUR 83,873,060 from 2008 to 
2013. However, this is a speculative sum since the precise cost is not known.45  
                                                          
40   See Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing 
a European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-Operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union”, 25 November 2004, available at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_regulation_en.pdf 
41 Its main duties include (a) co-ordination of operational cooperation among Member States;(b) training 
activities for national border guards;(c) risk analyses in the field of border management;(d) development of scientific 
research on border surveillance;(e) technical and operational assistance at external borders when required;(f) assistance 
in the organization of joint return operations, see Council Regulation No 2007/2004 
42  Based on our own calculations from the 2008-2013 Tables on Awarded Grants available at the Frontex 
website:  http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/governance-documents/  
43 Data provided by Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 4 September 2014 
44  See  Ministry of Exterior website, “Frontex: Common European Operations”, last updated 1 April 2011, 
available at http://www.mfa.gr/exoteriki-politiki/i-ellada-stin-ee/europaikos-horos-dikaiosinis-eleutherias-kai-
asfaleias.html?page=5 
45 The precise cost is not known since Frontex’s Headquarters were unable to answer all our queries. The sum is 
based on our own calculations, by adding up the sums from the 2008-2013 Tables on Awarded Grants, which were then 
juxtaposed to the Archive of Operations available at http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of-operations/ . The 
Poseidon Program was hosted by both Greece and Bulgaria. The available data do not allow us however to distinguish 
which country spent what sums. 
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With an average annual budget of EUR 40,000,000 in Frontex' overall operational budget, a 
rough 25%, appears to have been set aside for the implementation of Greece's 2008-2013 
Poseidon Program.46  
The most important, however, operation was the launch of Operation RABIT, an emergency 
operation under the auspices of FRONTEX, aiming at halting the influx of irregular migrants 
through the Greek-Turkish land border. The significance of the project lies, among others, in its 
symbolic value; it was the first time that an EU Member State invoked a situation of emergency 
and asked for assistance to guard its borders. It also meant that Greece acknowledged its limited 
ability to guard its external land borders from incoming flows. the RABIT operation lasted 
between 2 November 2010 and 2 March 2011 and cost EUR 4,4 million. In total 576 officers 
working around 19,000 man-days and specialized in different areas of border management (e.g. 
false-document detection, detection, dog handling, stolen vehicle checks, de-briefing) were 
deployed. By the end of February 2011, the average number of migrants apprehended in the 
region, had dropped from 250 per day to 58. In terms of size and speed, it was considered the 
fastest and most successful response to an emergency call by an EU Member State.47  
The overall financial support, thus, provided by Frontex, between 2008-2013 was EUR 26,5 
million, if we calculate it on the basis of grants awarded to Greece, and minimum of EUR 87 
million, if we calculate it on the basis of the overall budget aside in the context of operational 
assistance and capacity building. 
 
 Table 5. Frontex Financial Contribution to Greece between 2008-2013 
 Financial Contribution  Indicative Indirect Financial Contribution 
2008-
2013 
Grants awarded 
to Greece 
26 million Poseidon Program 
RABIT Operation 
 83 million 
4.4 million 
TOTAL  26 million  >87.4 million 
 
EEA Grants 
A third major source of financial support has been the EEA Grants. Established in 1994, it is an 
inter-governmental funding scheme that aims at alleviating social and economic disparities 
among Member States. The funding does not solely focus on migration and asylum but covers a 
wider spectrum of socio-economic issues. Since 1998, the donor States of the EEA Grants 
                                                          
46 Based on our own calculations from Frontex' annual work programs, available at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/governance-documents/  
47 For more on Operation Rabit see Frontex, “RABIT Operation 2010 Evaluation Report”, August 2011, Warsaw, 
available at   http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/fer_rabit_2010_screen_v6.pdf  
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Framework have been Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. During the period 2009-2014, €993 
million were set aside, with Norway sponsoring 94% of the fund.   
Once more the EU Commission plays an instrumental role, as the size of the funding allocated 
to each Member State is negotiated between the sponsor countries and the European 
Commission. This then serves as a framework for negotiation with each individual country to 
agree on the funded programs. Once an agreement has been reached, a “Memorandum of 
Understanding” is signed between the EEA Grant Scheme and the beneficiary country.  
During the period 2009-2014, EUR 63 million were allocated to Greece. Of those, EUR 21 
million were invested in Greece’s asylum policy and assisted voluntary returns. In fact, 
Greece's asylum and migration policy absorbed 2.1% of the whole 2009-2014 EEA Grant Budget.  
 
Table 6. EEA Grants allocated to Greece (2009-2014) 
   
Program 1 Program 2 
Cost  Item Cost  Item 
1,115,000 IOM Assisted Voluntary Return 4,000,000 Interpretation at Asylum Service 
2,234,248 UNHCR Capacity-Building  for 
asylum reform 
9,000,000 First Reception Service- 240 
persons capacity 
4,874,760 272 places in open reception 
facilities (2013-2016) 
1,000,000 Temporary shelter for 
unaccompanied minors 
125,359 Seminars 734,176 Program management 
TOTAL COST: EUR 8,349,367  
(EEA Grant 100%: EUR 8,349,367 ) 
TOTAL COST: EUR 14,734,176   
(EEA Grant 85% : EUR 12,524,050) 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Taking into account the aforementioned figures, during the period 2008-2013 Greece received in 
terms of direct grants around EUR 432 million. Depending on whether we take into account also 
indirect contributions, Greece’s main sponsorship could be schematically presented as follows. 
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Figure 2a. Direct External Financial                Figure 2b. Indirect External Financial 
Contribution to Greece 2008-2013                 Contribution to Greece 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overall cost to manage the irregular migrant population within these funding schemes  was 
estimated at a minimum of half a billion Euros,  out of which around 15% was allocated to the 
asylum system, 30% in return policies and 55% in external border management.  
The emphasis is placed on ‘minimum’, since additional sums allocated from the national budget 
are not always known nor are easy to calculate. For instance, the Ministry of Marine and 
Mercantile announced recently that it spent in 2013 approximately EUR 62 million, in order to 
control the Greek Turkish sea border in the East Aegean Sea. In the case of the Greek Police, 
however, an analogous estimate would be more difficult, if not impossible, as tasks related to 
the management of irregular migration have in recent years been integrated into the regular 
duties of police officers. Likewise, private financial contributions, donations and voluntary work 
in particular by NGOs are not reflected in the above-described figures, as it would be difficult to 
estimate in monetary terms. 
For the purposes of this study, two conclusions are drawn thus far: first, that within the period 
2008-2013, Greece's irregular migration control policy has cost Greece and the EU a minimum 
of half a billion euros. Second, Greece’s policy priorities in the area of border control and asylum 
have been heavily influenced (to put it lightly) by the related EU policy priorities and decisions, 
as this last was the biggest sponsor of irregular migration control and asylum measures. 
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CHAPTER 2. BORDER CONTROL AND APPREHENSION 
Greece's revised National Action Plan Greece foresaw that an effective migration policy should 
ensure “access to international protection for all illegal migrants entering its territory”. In 
practice, however, the primary focus was on the deterrence and apprehension of irregular 
arrivals.48 Most funding was absorbed in this area, but Greece delved also deep into its national 
resources, in order to speedily implement the proposed policies.  
Greece's policy developed along the lines of a prevalent EU framework that views irregular 
migrants as ‘illegal migrants;’ a terminology that places the emphasis on policing, security and 
criminality and leaves little space for rights-based approaches.49 Under the Greek law, an 
irregular migrant is a criminal offender. Entering, staying or exiting the country, without the 
necessary legal formalities, is punishable with at least three-month imprisonment and a 
minimum fine of €1,500.50 In practice, public prosecutors most often refrain from initiating 
criminal proceedings against irregular migrants, who in turn become subjects of administrative 
proceedings and return procedures. 51  
From 2012 onwards, efforts focused on two major courses of actions: firstly, the reinforcement 
of the Greek-Turkish land border, which was at the time the main entry point of irregular 
migrants into the Greek territory;52 secondly, the identification (and removal ideally) of all 
illegally residing migrants in the country. The former was achieved through the erection of a 
fence along the Greek-Turkish border and launch of Operation Shield in the region; the latter 
was realized through Operation Xenios Zeus, which was a ‘stop and search’ policy targeting 
irregular migrants. Both measures were pioneering for national standards.   
The Fence at Evros  
The idea to construct a physical barrier along the 206-kilometer land border with Turkey, 
analogous to the fence between the US-Mexico borders, was first announced by the Ministry of 
Citizen Protection in January 2011. While Greece and Turkey are naturally separated by river, 
there is a 10km land strip through which migrants cross the border on foot, making it in turn an 
increasingly common entry point. Erecting a fence would not only offer a solution to the 
                                                          
48 See Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan 
on Asylum and Migration management, fn 23 
49 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to Greece, 17 April 2013, p. 15 
50 See the New Migration Code, entering force on 4 June 2014; see also Law 3386/2005, in particular Articles 
76,77,78,80,81,82,83 & 89 paras 1-3 that are still in force 
51 If the expulsion does not take place within three months, the public prosecutor who may revoke the decision 
on refraining from criminal proceedings provided that no more than a year has lapsed from the date of illegal entry of the 
third-country national in the country, Law 3386/2005 
52 Interview with Major General Tsouknadis, who estimated the number of irregular arrivals through the Greek-
Turkish land border at 300-400 per day, N. Vafeiadis, “Ο Έβρος δεν είναι πια “ξέφραγο αμπέλι', Kathimerini newspaper, 
04. August 2014, available at http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=179753  
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continuous influx of irregular migrants through the region, but also have a fundamentally 
'symbolic' value since it would send the message that Greece was taking its border management 
seriously.53 
 
Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the Fence’s Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The construction of the fence started on October 2011 and was completed on December 2012. 
The initial proposal foresaw the construction of a 12,5 km fence at an estimated cost of EUR 4.8 
million,54 later raised to EUR 5.5 million. An early attempt to draw funding from the External 
Borders Fund was rejected by the European Commission as “pointless”, since “ […]Fences and 
walls are short term measures that do not solve migration management issues in a structural 
way”.55 In the Commission's view, technical equipment, such as thermal cameras, X-rays, and 
specially equipped vehicles, was preferable in terms of effectiveness.   
The final construction is 10,365 km long and runs along the north-eastern side of the Greek-
Turkish borders, between the villages of Kastanies and Nea Vyssa. It consists of two cement 
                                                          
53 See Minister of Citizen Protection, Statements to Media, 6 August 2012, available at 
http://www.minocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=&perform=view&id=4076&Itemid=529  
54  See Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply, 4 August 2011, available at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7459324.pdf  
55  See “Minister in EU rove over fence”, Kathimerini newspaper, 7 February 2012, available at 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_07/02/2012_426615  
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walls with barbed wire in- between and has an average height of 3 metres.56 It runs exclusively 
on Greek soil and is alleged to be at its closest only one meter away from the Turkish border. 
In terms of cost, a private company undertook the erection of the fence at a price of EUR 3.16 
million, paid exclusively by national resources. In order to make such an expensive undertaking 
possible, Greece had to amend its national law, as the Hellenic Police was at the time allowed to 
implement projects with a lower ceiling. The final price included the building alone as the design 
and building study had been done by the Greek authorities. According to the media the overall 
actual cost was as high as EUR 7,5 million.  
Operation Shield (Aspida) 
Three months before the completion of the Evros fence, Operation Shield (Aspida) was 
launched. Its main purpose was to control and deter irregular arrivals by strengthening the 
physical presence of patrol officers at the Greek-Turkish land border. 57 
Operation Shield was launched on 2 August 2012 and its first phase lasted until 2 February 
201358, during which 1,881 police officers were deployed.59 Contrary to the Evros fence that 
covered only a 5% of the overall land border between Greece and Turkey, Operation Shield 
spread all along the 206 km riverline. While most officers were assigned border management 
duties, part of the staff were assigned reception and screening duties, including asylum 
management and informing irregular immigrants about their rights.60 Upon completion of the 
first phase, Operation Shield was extended until June 2013 and has since continued. 
The initial phase, lasting 6 months, cost a total of EUR 16 million. Its 5-month extension until 
June 2013 cost a further EUR 8 million, raising thus the total cost to EUR 24 million.61 As the 
number of irregular migrants entering through the specific land strip decreased, the number of 
                                                          
56  See Police Headquarters, Ministry of Citizen Protection,  Announcement of Public Consultation for the 
Technical Descriptions and Technical Features of a Barrier on the Greek-Turkish Land border in the Evros region, August 
2011, available at http://s.enet.gr/resources/article-files/04-08-11_texnhto_empodio.pdf ; See  “Ολοκληρώθηκε ο 
Φράχτης στον Έβρο”, Kathimerini newspaper, 16 December 2012, available at   
http://www.kathimerini.gr/22730/article/epikairothta/ellada/oloklhrw8hke-o-fraxths-ston-evro  
57 See Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply of 23 August 2012, available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7696899.pdf  
58  The Operation was first announced on 30 July 2012. It was initialy aimed to last only two months, but has 
continued ever since. See Frontex, Fran Quarterly, Issue 3, July-September 2012, available at  
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2012.pdf  
59 783 Border Guards were posited under the Alexandroupolis Police Directorate and 745 to the Orestiada Police 
Directorate. 140 border guards were sent to  to the Police Durectorate of Xanthi and a further 213 to Rodopi.  
60 On the selection process of the personnel, see Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply of 23 August 
2012, available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7696899.pdf   
61  See Ministry of Citizen Protection, Revised National Action Plan on Greek Asylum and Migration Management, 
2013, p. 96 
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police officers was subsequently also reduced to half. 62 To cover the costs, Greece drew funding 
(75%) from the External Borders fund as well as its own national resources. While the salaries of 
the police officers were borne by the Greek State, functional expenditures (tanker truck vehicles, 
etc) were co-financed by the Commission.  
Operation Xenios Zeus 
Operation Xenios Zeus was launched almost simultaneously with Operation Shield and was 
purported to act as its ‘internal’ counterpart, aspiring to exercise an analogous kind of control-
this time to the interior of Greece.  On 16 July 2014, it was incorporated into the standard police 
procedures and patrols and renamed as ‘Operation Theseus'. The previous operation, 'Xenios 
Zeus',63named after the patron god of travelers in ancient Greece, had met with little public 
support.  
Operation Xenios Zeus comprised of a series of regular round-up operations carried out in 
areas with high concentration of irregular migrants, including street and house searches. It was 
an impressively large scale operation- both in terms of geographic coverage and intensity, 
including large urban centres. In the beginning, checks took place on an almost daily basis. The 
controls performed were of a sweeping nature: every migrant who happened to be in the area 
of the operational activity was stopped and subjected to document checks, a procedure that 
could last several hours and would often take place in public. Asylum seekers and regular 
migrants were no exception. A total of 65,000 were stopped from the beginning of the operation 
in August until 24 December 2012, out of whom only 4,128 were arrested for illegally staying in 
the country. The Operation was heavily criticised by the European Council for Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 7 September 2012, available at www.ecre.org ) for the risks it 
entailed for asylum seekers. 
In terms of resources, the precise number of officers deployed is not known, nor is the exact 
number of expenditure incurred64. In the Attica region alone, Operation Xenios Zeus was first 
announced to have mobilized 2,000 officers.65 Since the control of irregular migrants forms part 
of the regular duties of a police officer, costs were absorbed through the salaries of police 
officers and regular operational expenses of the Greek Police.66  
                                                          
62 See N. Vafeiadis, “Ο Έβρος δεν είναι πια 'ξέφραγο αμπέλι”, Kathimerini newspaper, 4 August 2014 availble at  
http://www.kathimerini.gr/778815/article/epikairothta/ellada/o-evros-den-einai-pia-3efrago-ampeli  
63  See X. Pantzou, “Ο Ξένιος Ζευς αποχαιρέτισε τον τόπο που τον γέννησε”, 18 November 2013, available at 
http://www.unhcr.gr/1againstracism/ο-ξένιος-ζευς-αποχαιρέτισε-τον-τόπο-πο/  
64  See M Yiannakaki, Question to the Minister of Public Order and Citizen protection, 7 August 2014, available at 
http://mariayannakaki.gr/δημοκρατικη-αριστερα-μαρια-γιαννακακη-βουλη/819-επιχ_ξενιος_ζευς  
65  See Greek Police,  Press Release of 4 August 2012, available at 
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang='..'&perform=view&id=18424&Itemid=950&lang=  
66 See Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply of 20 September 2013, available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8202865.pdf ; See however also 
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Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness 
 
All three major undertakings, the Evros fence, Operation Shield and Operation Zeus served a 
wider spectrum of objectives: restore public order, protect public health, combat criminality, 
enhance tourism, and improve the working conditions of police officers in 'problematic' areas. 
Within the context of irregular migration management however, the main objectives were two: 
1. to stop irregular arrivals by targeting specific entry points  
2. to arrest and detect irregular migrants who nonetheless managed to cross the border, with a 
view to returning them to their home countries. 
The main tools to achieve this were: (a) the construction of a technical barrier and physical 
presence on the one hand; (b) deployment of specialised officers and sweeping round-up 
operations on the other.  
 
A. Preventing irregular arrivals through technical barriers and physical presence 
 
A1. Direct costs and direct outputs 
In terms of direct outputs, for the period 2008-2012 arrivals and apprehensions were relatively 
high at the land border. However, from 2012 to 2013, and in the aftermath of the Evros fence 
and Operation Shield there was a dramatic 96% reduction in registered irregular arrivals at the 
Greek-Turkish land border. At the same time however, there was a relative 231% increase in 
apprehensions at the sea border, previously reduced to couple hundred arrivals per annum.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Parliamentary Discussion of 22 October 2012, p.2934, during which, the then Minister of Citizen Protection mentioned 
that Operation Xenios Zeus was co-financed by the European Refugee Fund available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20121022.pdf 
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Table 7. Annual apprehensions of irregular migrants at Greek-Turkish land and sea borders 
 
Year Land Border   Sea Borders  TOTAL 
2008 14,461 30,149 44,610 
2009 8,787 27,685 36,472 
2010 47,088 6,204 53,292 
2011 54,974 1,114 56,088 
2012 30,433 3,651 34,043 
2013 1,122 11,447 12,233 
2014 (Aug.) 1,133 22,089 23,222 
 
Between 2010 and 2012, around EUR 41 million were allocated by the External Borders fund to 
fence the Greek-Turkish land border i.e. 36% of the available annual 2010-2012 EBF grant.67 If 
we include in our calculations the cost of the Evros fence and the Frontex operational 
contribution (Rabbit, Poseidon Land 2010-2012), then between 2010 and 2012 the overall funds 
set aside for the Greek-Turkish land border, appear to have been around EUR 67 million.68 These 
were invested in a land strip of 206 km, with the understanding that this was a passage of 
strategic significance.  
 
A2. Assessing the cost-effectiveness 
If we assess the effectiveness of these measures in terms of absolute numbers, then this was 
indeed an effective policy since it drastically reduced the number of irregular arrivals through 
the specific landstrip. The available data show that this decrease continued in the course of 
2014, indicating that the policy has been successful thus far.  
However, if we assess the effectiveness of this policy in relative numbers, then it appears less 
successful, since the reduction through the land-border was accompanied with a parallel steady 
rise in entries through the sea border. The figures of 2014, for example, suggest that the entries 
have so far doubled in comparison to 2013.  
It might be useful at this point, to look at the overall number of irregular arrivals that show that 
entry through land or sea border has been shifting in the overall, even in the absence of a 
                                                          
67  Calculation based on the Annual Programs submitted by the Ministry of Citizen protection to the External 
Borders Fund, available at 
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=2231&Itemid=440  
68 Calculation based on: (a) Operational Cost of Poseidon Land 2010, 2011, 2012; (b)Annual Programs 2010, 
2011, 2012 EBF (EU funding and National Resources); (c)Construction of Evros Fence (d) Rabit Operation.  
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fence and ‘Operation Shield’. This may indicate that the reduction of entries in 2012-2013 was 
not necessarily the output of the technical barrier and the presence of police officers but may 
also be attributable to a combination of other factors. 69  
Figure 4. Apprehensions at the Greek-Turkish Land and Sea Borders 
 
Note: data refer to apprehensions, not to people. Hence the same person if apprehended twice counts 
twice. Emphasis is added by the authors to signal peaks of apprehensions at different borders.  
Source: Greek police data, www.astynomia.gr  
 
For the period 2012-2013, the rapid decrease in arrivals might have also been the result of the 
wide circulation that Operation Shield and the Evros fence had received, which could have acted 
as a deterrent. By 2014, when the wait-and-see period started fading off and conflict in the 
Middle East intensified, irregular entries started increasing.  
In general, erecting a wall and investing in particular entry points, can be effective in blocking 
the entry through that specific gate. However if the aforementioned policies seek to reduce 
irregular migration throughout the country then their effectiveness is limited, since migrants 
appear to simply be re-directed to other entry points. 
An effective policy is also not necessarily a cost-effective one. The main weakness of the 
aforementioned policy is that it seeks to curb irregular arrivals, only after the migrants have 
reached the gates of the country. As a result, authorities seek to identify or speculate on 
possible entry points and ‘barricade’ them. This approach is not cost-effective for two reasons: 
on the one hand it invests in areas which may lose completely in significance in the course of 
                                                          
69 It should be stressed that a technical barrier alone may not always be the sole reason for a change of route, 
as shifts of this kind do in general take place without the reasons being always so straightforward.  
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time; and second, the very high costs entailed in this kind of barrier (and its maintenance) 
consume the available budget very quickly.  
By way of illustration, the figure below shows for the period 2008-2013 that around 78% of the 
available budget under the External Borders Fund was invested in the purchase of technical 
equipment and new technology to strengthen Greece's borders. In contrast, training absorbed 
less than 4%. 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Allocated Funds under EBF 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purchase of technical equipment and technology included:  
Technical Equipment Technology 
Thermal cameras Purchase of Hardware (Desktops,Laptops,Scanners) 
Police Dogs Upgrade of extant network systems 
Night vision and long vision 
goggles 
Development of 2nd Generation Schengen Information 
System 
X-ray Vans, 4x4 vehicles, buses Intrusion Detection and Prevention System 
Patrol Boats Radio-communication systems 
 
We have provided below an indicative list of purchases that the Greek authorities planned under 
the External Borders Fund, most of which were invested in the Greek-Turkish land border.70  
                                                          
70 See Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply of 11 August 2011, available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7464755.pdf ; see also Minstry of 
Citizen Protection, External Borders Fund Annual Programs 2011-2012, available at 
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=2231&Itemid=440 ;  
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Table 8. Purchases under External Borders Fund Annual Programs 2011-2012 
Description Units x Price (est.) Total Cost 
Portable thermal cameras 20 x 50,000 1,000,000 
Vans equipped with X-ray system 
 or thermal cameras and radar system 
3 x 850,000 2,550,000 
4x4 vehicles 150 x 30,000 4,500,000 
Police dogs 44 x 3,635 160,000 
Patrol Boats71 8 x 59,375 475,000 
 
The policy is also not cost-effective given Greek geography, which makes the country vulnerable 
through different border areas (land and sea). Looking at the figures, then the aforementioned 
measures are fairly expensive and require large investments across multiple border areas to be 
truly effective, since every time flows shift, so must resources. 
Policy Recommendations 
 
If Greece's primary policy objective is to reduce its irregular migrant population by deterring 
irregular arrivals, then there are alternative tools available such as awareness-raising 
campaigns. 
Awareness-raising campaigning was a project that was initially announced by the authorities, 
but appears to have been subsequently abandoned in favor of other priorities. Officers can be 
appointed in Greece's diplomatic services abroad, and create special focal points or film 
documentaries that will inform potential travelers of the Greek and the wider EU system on 
migration. In many cases, third-country nationals who escape poverty, rely on the information 
provided by smuggling networks that promise a Europe of opportunity and a better life in 
northern-European countries. There is often little awareness that an irregular migrant can hardly 
hope to regularize his/her stay and legitimately work in Europe. Given that very often an 
irregular migrant has been deeply indebted to the facilitator, by the time he/she has reached the 
EU external borders, there is little chance that he/she will decide to turn back simply because 
Greece has erected a fence. In fact, entry will be achieved after repeated efforts. Cost-
                                                          
71  refers to maritime borders 
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effectiveness thus requires halting the influx towards Greece from the country of origin. Such 
information campaigns have been pioneered by the UK and Australia among other governments 
privileging in recent times the use of online media. This is an avenue worth exploring not only by 
Greece but by the entire EU.72 
 
B. Apprehension: direct costs v. direct outputs 
In terms of detection and apprehension and direct outputs, between 2008 and 2013, the overall 
number of apprehensions in Greece did, indeed, decrease. Yet, it has increased again in the 
course of 2014.  
 
 
Table 9. Apprehensions of Irregular Migrants 2008-2014 
Year Total Number of Apprehensions 
2008 146,337 
2009 126,145 
2010 132,524 
2011 99,368 
2012 76,878 
2013 43,002 
2014 (Aug). 41,930 
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Greece's apprehension policy, it is not enough to 
merely look at the total number of apprehensions and its fluctuation. A decrease in arrivals is, 
as previously mentioned, due to a number of reasons, at times unrelated to Greece's migration 
policy (eg financial crisis, seasonal workers' agreement with Albania). Instead, we need to 
examine to what extent apprehension has served its main objective of return and as a second 
step, whether this was done in a cost-effective manner.  
This is a challenge since both costs and the necessary data against which this hypothesis may be 
tested, are only partially available. For instance, the rate of migrants who escape detection and 
                                                          
72  UK Home office, “Information dissemination to potential asylum seekers in countries of origin and transit”, 
Home Office Findings 220, London: UK Home Office, 2014; Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe (2013) Establishing an 
Evidence-Base for Future Policy Development on Irregular Migration to Australia, June 2013, Occasional Paper, 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Government. 
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the cost of Operation Zeus, are unknown. While, in terms of content, the measures appear much 
targeted, the lack of available figures on those who were not apprehended and end-result of 
apprehensions (e.g. release, asylum application, expulsion, voluntary return etc) hinder any 
effort to assess the cost-effectiveness of the measures.  
 
Table 10. Statistics Operation Zeus, 2.8.2013-31.12.2013  
Period Migrants Checked Migrants arrested 
02.8.2012 – 31.12.2012 65,766 4,145 
01.1.2013-31.1.2013 9,167 275 
01.2.2013- 31.12.2013 N/A 1,126 
TOTAL N/A 5,546 
Source: www.astynomia.gr  
  
Specifically for Operation Xenios Zeus, the direct output made available by the Hellenic Policy is 
the number of migrants stopped and those who were, in the end, apprehended.  
 
 
Figure 6: Checks and Apprehensions – Operation Xenios Zeus, Aug.- Dec. 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In quantitative terms, the sweeping nature of the operation produced an impressive number of 
stops-and-checks. In qualitative terms, however, more than 90% of the migrants that were 
rounded up were subsequently released. In other words, the chances that a rounded-up person 
would be an irregular migrant were as low as 6%. Suffice to note that in the course of 2013, the 
arrest rate dropped even lower.  
Taking into account the thousands of police officers initially deployed and the hours spent to 
operate these round ups and subsequent controls, the operation does not appear to be a cost-
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effective policy tool, as more than 90% of resources are wasted on checks that did not lead to 
the detection of undocumented migrants or rejected asylum seekers.73 In addition, one should 
consider the indirect cost to society of so many police persons taken off their regular duties (of 
patrolling the streets and combatting organised crime - including armed robberies and other 
violent forms of crime - indeed a serious public issue in recent years in Greece)   
In 2013, the apprehensions completed within the context of Operation Xenios Zeus represented 
only 3,2% of all apprehensions of irregular migrants in Greece.  
 
Table 11. Apprehensions Xenios Zeus- Overall Apprehensions 2013 
 
Period Apprehensions Xenios 
Zeus 
Overall apprehensions in Greece 
2013 1,401 43,002 
 
 
Policy Recommendations 
1. More comprehensive and accurate Data collection (to allow better evaluation of policies): If 
arrest is Greece's first pillar, in securing the return of irregular migrants to their countries of 
origins, it is important that more accurate data are kept to monitor the final outcome of its 
apprehension practices.  
2. Investment in identification of forged documents: Under the current scheme, in the course of 
a round up operations all migrants are gathered together, transferred to the headquarters and 
their documents are checked there. Very often this procedure may take many hours, either 
because there is no bus available or simply because the number of persons rounded up is large 
and takes time to process. This is a time-consuming and inefficient practice for both the people 
checked and the migrants involved. More funds could be invested in forged documentation 
technology.  
3. Appropriate training of police officers involved in such operations: The authorities should 
invest in screening and linguistic training so that identification becomes faster. This would cut 
down on the time of the operation and save resources which could be spent elsewhere (eg. 
regular police duties to combat criminality). 
                                                          
73 For a Parliamentary Discussion on Operation Xenios Zeus see 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20120927.pdf  
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CHAPTER 3: DETENTION 
The systematic use of detention is increasingly regarded as the most effective tool to secure the 
return of the arrested migrant to his/her country of origin. In the period 2008-2013, detention 
became Greece's flagship policy in the management of irregular migration.   
Among the most radical changes were the introduction of indiscriminate and indefinite 
detention into the Greek legal order; at the same time, an unprecedented financial investment 
in improving and expanding detention facilities was undertaken. The External Borders Fund 
and European Return Fund were Greece's main sponsors within this new policy course, as the 
construction and running costs of most facilities were co-financed by the EU at a 75% rate. 
Nonetheless, detention has also proven to be a particularly costly enterprise. 
 
Detention as Punishment  
From the perspective of international human rights law, detaining an irregular migrant in the 
context of removal processes is considered a particularly harsh measure, only exceptionally 
allowed and under very specific requirements.74 In line with this fundamental rule, Directive 
2008/115/EC (Return Directive) lays down a particular restrictive framework when it comes to 
the use of detention on irregular migrants. 
First, the use of detention must be limited. It is a last resort measure that can only be justified 
if less coercive measures are not sufficient. Second, it needs to be of the shortest time possible 
and can only be maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress; in any case, it can 
never exceed 18 months. Third, the conditions must be appropriate; the detained irregular 
migrants must be kept in specialized facilities and be treated in a humane and dignified 
manner.75  
The Greek legislative framework on detention is in line with the EU common standards. There 
are currently three different regimes in place that regulate the detention of irregular migrants 
on the basis of the following categories: 
a. irregular migrants arrested upon entry into the Greek territory 
b. irregular migrants arrested within the interior of Greece, (this includes rejected asylum-
seekers) 
c. asylum seekers 
                                                          
74  See ECtHR, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No (Grand Chamber) 13229/03, Judgment of 29 January 
2008, paras. 67-74 
75  See Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals 
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The differences between these frameworks are rather faint and result from the transposition of 
different EU Directives in a non-integrated manner76: 
 
Table 12. Greek Legislative Framework on Detention of Irregular Migrants 
  irregular entry into the 
country 
irregular stay in the country  Asylum seekers  
(new claims) 
Law Law 3386/2005  
(as amended) 
Law 3907/2011 P.D.113/2013 
 
Grounds  
 (a) Risk of 
absconding 
 (b) Danger to Public 
Order 
(a) Risk of absconding 
(b) Danger to National 
Security 
(c) Hampers own Removal 
Process 
(a) Identification purposes 
(b) Danger to public 
order/national security 
(c) Prompt examination of 
asylum claim 
 
Maximum 
Length  
18 months 18 months 18 months 
Purpose Expulsion Return (forced/voluntary)  
 
Facility 
• “Special Holding 
Facility”, (Art. 81, N. 
3386/2005) 
• Police stations  
Specialised Facilities  
(Art. 31, N.3907/2011) 
Specialised Facilities (Art. 31, 
3907/2011) 
  
Authority 
 
Police Directorate 
 
Police Directorate 
Police Directorate.  
(a), (c): Prior 
recommendation of Asylum 
Office required 
 
There is however a significant divergence between the letter of the law and its 
implementation.  
Throughout the period 2008-2013, the detention of irregular migrants has been both 
widespread and marked by a growing trend to circumvent the maximum allowed period of 
detention.77 As a result, Greece was repeatedly convicted by the European Court of Human 
                                                          
76 For a recent study on Greece's detention framework towards irregular migrants see  M Marouda, V. Saranti, E. 
Koutsouraki and M. Rossidi, “”The use of Detention and Alternatives to Detention in the Context of Immigration POlicies”, 
EMM Study 2014, available at  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/12a-greece_detention_study_august2014_en.pdf  
77 See A. Triandafyllidou, D. Angeli and A. Dimitriadi, “Detention as Punishment”, Midas Policy brief, April 2014 
available at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Polic-brief-Detention-in-Greece-1.pdf  
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Rights, both with regards to the conditions of detention and the arbitrariness and automatic 
manner in which migrants were deprived of their liberty.78 Nonetheless, Greece upheld its 
detention policy; it carried out a series of legislative amendments, in order to ‘legalise’ its 
practices, in line with a toughening policy towards irregular migrants followed by other 
Member States.79  
Among the most noteworthy developments was the gradual expansion of the maximum allowed 
period of detention, from three (3) months to 18 months. In terms of the grounds of detention, 
a controversial amendment in 201280 specified that persons who suffer from a contagious 
disease, or are at increased risk of contracting them- either because of the situation in their 
country of origin or because they live under unhygienic conditions -are “dangerous to public 
order” and may also be detained.81  
In 2013, the use of systematic and indefinite detention became formally Greece's policy 
priority, publicly announcing that “Our aim is that every illegal migrant, unless the competent 
authorities decide that he is entitled to international protection, will be detained until he is 
returned to his home country”82. A few months later, the concept of indefinite detention was 
also formally introduced into the Greek legal order via a rather controversial advisory opinion of 
the Council of State.83   
According to the Greek authorities, the main reason behind this new policy was that shorter 
detention time and release before executing an expulsion/return were deemed ineffective in 
securing the removal of the third country national.  
Statistics in the last three years showed that an estimated 30% of all migrants apprehended at 
the borders or the mainland, i.e. almost 93,000, were residing irregularly in Greece, with a 
pending expulsion decision. These migrants did not apply for international protection nor were 
they under a return procedure.84 If, however, detention capacity increased, this would achieve a 
                                                          
78  See ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, Appl. no. 
12186/08, Judgment of 22 July 2010; Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 26 November 2009; Rahimi v. 
Greece, Appl. No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011; R. U. v. Greece, Appl. no. 2237/08, Judgment of 7 June 2011 
79  See Claire de Senarclens, Forced Migration Review, fall 2013, Issue 44, page 60 
80 Law 4075/2012 
81 So far there has been reluctance to apply this provision in the context of irregular migration. Instead, the most 
frequently used justification, applicable in an automatic manner, is that the migrant “lacks the necessary travel 
documents, has no permanent residence and is likely to abscond” 
82  See Minister of Citizen Protection, Press Office Reply  concerning the events at Amygdaleza, 11 August 2013, 
availa ble at http://www.yptp.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=GR&perform=view&id=4736&Itemid=579   (Our 
translation of Greek original: “Στόχος μας είναι κάθε παράνομος μετανάστης, εφόσον τα αρμόδια όργανα κρίνουν ότι δεν 
δικαιούται διεθνούς προστασίας, να κρατείται μέχρι να επιστρέψει στην πατρίδα του.”) ; (emphasis added) 
83  This measure is expected to be revoked in the coming weeks 
84  See Ministry of Citizen Protection, Revised Greek Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management, 2013, p. 
53 
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significant increase in returns. At the same time, it would send a strong deterrent signal to third-
country nationals planning to enter Greece, and thus the EU territory, unauthorized.85  
The aim of the indefinite and indiscriminate detention, thus, was two-fold:  
(1) to increase the return rate, in the short-term, in particular voluntary return among detained 
migrants 
(2) to discourage irregular arrivals in the medium and long term.   
 
Detention Facilities 
In line with this policy, there are currently four types of facilities, in which an irregular migrant in 
Greece may in practice be held with a view to be returned to his/her home country. Many of 
these facilities have actually existed for years; following a recent series of renovations they re-
opened with a new name and categorization.  
 
Table 13. Detention Facilities in Greece 
Type Target Group Main Source of funding 
Pre-Removal Centres Irregular migrants under 
return procedure  
European Return Fund 
Special Holding Facilities Irregular migrants under 
return procedure 
European Return Fund 
Border Guard Units Irregular migrants, awaiting 
transfer to shelters or pre-
removal centres 
 External Borders Fund 
Police Stations Irregular migrants  National Resources 
 
Pre-Removal Centres & Special Holding Facilities 
Pre-removal and special holding facilities are Greece's typical detention centres. Special holding 
facilities have existed since 2008. The first “pre-removal” centre, Amygdaleza, opened its doors 
in 2012. The purpose of both types of establishment is to facilitate removal process of irregular 
migrants. From a legal perspective, there is no difference between these two categories, as the 
Greek law itself does not categorize further the type of establishments in which irregular 
migrants should be held. In fact, in many respects, both kinds of facilities have been operating 
under a rather unclear legal framework for many years. In 2013, an “Internal Regulation of 
                                                          
85  Ibid.  
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Operation of the Security Services of Immigration Detention Facilities” was prepared, which 
sought to establish for the first time a common framework of operation of these centres as well 
as set rules with regard to the behaviour of the staff and the rights and duties of the 
detainees. In terms of duration, detention in pre-removal centres and special holding facilities 
has no specific pattern and depends on influx and capacity. The maximum allowed length of 
detention is 18 months, although, as mentioned earlier, in the course of 2014 there have been 
cases where this was exceeded.86 
Table 14: Current capacity in migrant detention centres  
Pre-Removal Centre Current Capacity Aliens Special 
Holding Facilities 
Current Capacity 
Amygdaleza 2,000 Central- P.Ralli 373 
Corinth 1,024 Amygdaleza Minors  40 
Fylakio 374 Aspropyrgos 140 
Komotini 540 Amarousio 42 
Parenesti 557 Elliniko- (Old facility) 63 
Xanthi 490 Elliniko (New facility) 123 
  Piraeus (closed since 
2012) 
56 
TOTAL 4,985 TOTAL 837 
*Data provided by the Greek Police, 1 April 2014, 24 June 2014 
 
                                                          
86  Police Reply, 24 June 2014 
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Table 15: Number of Detainees, 2008-2013 
Pre-Removal Centre Number of Detainees 
2012-2013 
Aliens Special Holding 
Facilities 
Number of Detainees 
2008-2013 
Amygdaleza 6,090 Central (P.Ralli) 36,803 
Corinth 2,523 Amygdaleza 
(Minors)  
3,072 
Fylakio 1,340 Aspropyrgos 10,158 
Komotini 997 Elliniko (Old Facility, 
open since 2010) 
2,890 
Parenesti 2627 Elliniko (New facility) 8,828 
Xanthi 23,768 Peiraius (closed since 
2012) 
2,255 
  Amarousiou 2,590 
TOTAL 37,345 TOTAL 66,956 
* Data provided by Greek Police, Reply 1. April 2014, 24 June 2014 
 
Border Guard Units and Police Stations 
Border guard units are stationed at Greece's border areas. Though, like with Police Stations, they 
are not detention facilities as such, they tend to serve as temporary holding places, until transfer 
to a shelter or detention centre is feasible. In practice, however, an irregular migrant may spend 
months enclosed in these establishments. 
 
Table 16. Detention Statistics Border Guard Units- Police Stations 2008-2013 
Border Guard Units Police Stations 
Capacity Actual Number of 
Detainees 
Capacity/ Actual Number of 
Detainees 
Didymoteicho 15  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
Kyprinou 374 
Metaxadon 11 
Ferres 72 
Nea Vyssa 11 
Orestiada 15 
Soufli 32 
TOTAL 530   
*Data provided by Greek Police, 24 June 2014 
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At an operational level, all the above-described facilities are under the responsibility of the 
Greek police.87  Security is provided by the Police and medical services are normally provided by 
NGOs.88 In their absence, medical aid is provided on an emergency basis by public hospitals. In 
the context of pre-removal centres, all main services (cleaning, food catering, and clothing) have 
been sub-contracted to private companies. The aim is in the future, to also sub-contract security 
to private companies.  
Direct outputs  
In terms of direct outputs, in the period of 2008-2013, a minimum total of 104,351 detainees 
were registered in Greece. This figure includes pre-removal centres and special holding facilities. 
It excludes police stations and border guard units. Despite repeated requests, the Police was 
unable to produce figures of detainees in these establishments.  
If such data are not kept, it is an important gap in monitoring implementation of policy 
measures since a significant number of migrants are actually held in these establishments.89 
Absence of the precise figure, biases the results in terms of policy-making and budget 
distribution.  
In terms of long-term outputs (deterrence), the policy is still too short-lived in order for us to be 
able to calculate its effect, as its implementation is less than two years old.  
In terms of short term outputs (increase in returns) if we focus on the period 2012-2013 as a test 
case, by which time most pre-removal centres were functioning, a total of 54,603 detainees 
were registered in Greece (pre-removal/special holding facilities).  
                                                          
87  p.d. 141/1991; Order 181/2006;  
88  eg. Medical Intervention and Medecins sans Frontieres. See Ministry of Labour, Directorate of Social Solidarity, 
European Refugee Fund Annual Programs 2009, 2010, available at http://www.moh.gov.gr/articles/social-
solidarity/domes-kai-draseis-koinwnikhs-allhleggyhs/eyrwpa-ko-tameio-prosfygwn-2008-2013/225-ethsia-programmata  
89 See Council of Europe Committee on the Prevention of Torture, Reports on Detention Conditions in Greece, 
available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states/grc.htm  
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Table 17.  Number of Detainees, 2012-2013 
Type Capacity Detainees Statistics 
Border Guard Units 560 N/A 
Special Holding Facilities 837 17,458 
Pre-Removal Centres 4,985 37,345 
Police Stations N/A N/A 
TOTAL 6,867 54,803 
*Data provided by the Greek Police, 28 January 2014, 24 June 2014, 1 April 2014 
 
In addition, from 2012-2013 there was an overall increase in the rate of voluntary and forced 
returns of irregular migrants.  
 
Table 18. Returns (forced-voluntary) 2012-2013 
Year Forced Returns Voluntary Returns Total 
2012 6,798 11,526 20,473 
2013 8,780 9,962 16,490 
 *Data provided by the Greek Police, 24 June 2014 and 1 April 2014 and IOM 2 June 2014 
 
However, in terms of absolute numbers at least, a link between detention and return does not 
appear to have been established. 
Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness 
From an economic perspective, effectiveness does not require 100% enforcement. For every 
law, there is an “optimal amount of enforcement” which depends on a series of variables: the 
cost of apprehension, the cost of carrying out the punishment (e.g. imprisonment is more costly 
compared to fines) and the response of the offender to the enforcement (deterrent effect of 
conviction). In his seminal work, Gary Becker90, a famous economist, argued 40 years ago that 
optimal policy equilibrium requires that the costs entailed outbalance the social damages 
caused by the crime (e.g. loss of society's earnings). Deterrence alone is, thus, not a sufficient 
reason to counterbalance all other costs; and detention as such weighs heavily within the scale, 
                                                          
90  See G. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Essays in the Economics of Crime and 
Punishment, G. Becker and W. L. Landes (eds), 1974, UMI publ., pp. 1-54,  available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3625.pdf    
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because it is very costly and causes losses not only to the offender but to society as a whole. As 
a rule, milder punishments should therefore be preferred.  
Greece's indiscriminate detention policy falls behind in terms of cost-effectiveness on several 
fronts. 
First, it exceeds Greece's current budget. In particular, the average cost of detaining an irregular 
migrant in Greece is 16 euros/per day,91 of which 5,87 euros are invested in daily food catering. 
Compared to other EU Member States, the overall sum is very low92 and does not suffice to 
secure the basic needs of the detainees.93 In fact, NGOs often provide detainees with basic items 
out of their own resources.94 Nonetheless, on the basis of the current capacity of pre-removal 
centres (4,985), detention costs Greece and the EU a minimum of EUR 28,713,600 per year 
(excluding special holding facilities, police stations and border guard units). Greece's plan is to 
create a total of 7,500 places of detention, 95 which would entail a minimum annual cost of EUR 
43,200,000.  
To compare, in 2013 alone, Greece's return policy (pre-removal centres and return operations) 
ran under a total budget of EUR 46 million (EU funding and national resources). This means that 
the available funds are insufficient to carry the costs of such an expanded and expansive 
detention policy and practice.  
Second, the cost of detention weighs heavily within the Return Fund scheme. Approximately 
32 % of the allocation has so far been consumed to cover costs related to detention facilities, 
in order to improve their conditions. Given Greece's other needs, in the end only 50% was left 
to operate actual returns. 96 If we add to this the planned annual running costs, EUR 43,2 
million, then Greece will have to seriously cut down on its other operations incorporated in the 
European Return Fund to carry out its planned detention policy.  
                                                          
91  Calculated on the basis of the annual running costs of pre-removal centres divided by their capacity, as in 
Ministry of Citizen Protection, Revised National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management, Chapter 4, 2013. See 
also Joint Ministerial Decision No 2/30866/0022 by the Ministers of Finances and of Public Order, dated 12.7.2001; See 
also Minister of Citizen Protection, Parliamentary Reply of 03 February 2014 available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8341922.pdf  
92 For a comparative overview of the different detention regimes among EU Member States see Global Detention 
Project, “Europe Profiles”, available at  http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe.html  
93  See Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, “Report to 
the Greek Government on the visit to Greece from 4 to 16 April 20130”, 16 October 2014, available at  
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2014-26-inf-eng.pdf  
94 Interview with Medecins sans Frontieres, 5 May 2014 
95  The original plan was to create 10,000 places of detention by the end of 2014. See Commission Staff Working 
Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan on Asylum and Migration management, 6 
October 2014   
96 Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan on 
Asylum and Migration Management, 2014, p. 14 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Allocated Funds under European Return Fund, 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, Greece designed its policy under the assumption that detainees would agree to return 
within a relatively short period of time.97 In practice, however, its expectations were not always 
met. In the course of 2013, the majority of irregular migrants refused to return; out of those, 
300 migrants had been detained for more than 18 months.98 An unknown number was 
subsequently released by the police, because they simply refused to return even after 24 
months of detention and another 150 detainees were released after the Greek courts ruled that 
detaining them beyond 18 months was unlawful.99,  
However, because detention is costly, even a minimal loss may translate into millions of euros. 
In the case of the 150 detainees for instance, the loss in resources was EUR 1,3 million within 1,5 
year; in the case of the 300 migrants, the loss was almost EUR 2,6 million in 1.5 year. If we take 
now the hypothetical scenario that all detention centres are operational at full capacity, should a 
30% of all detainees refuse to return per year, this would translate into an annual loss of EUR 
12,960,000 invested in their detention, i.e. almost 1/3 of Greece's 2013 grant under the 
European Return Fund. 
Greece's plan was further based on the assumption that asylum claims would be processed 
within 2 months; in case of a negative decision, the migrants would be promptly returned. In the 
course of 2013-2014, the average time needed to examine an asylum claim submitted by a 
                                                          
97   National Action on Asylum and Migration Management, 2013, p. 53, “ all immigrants who do no fall under the 
status of international protection … will be arrested, detained and returned to their countries of origin. In the case of an 
application for international protection, this … will be examined in a maximum period of 2 months, and if rejected, the 
illegal immigrant will be returned” 
98 See Greek Legal Council, Advisory Opinion 44/2014, available at 
http://www.nsk.gov.gr/webnsk/gnwmodothsh.jsp?gnid=1868995  
99  See D. Aggelidis,  “Ελεύθερος ο ένας από τους τρεις εξεγερμένους κρατούμενους του ΕΛληνικού”, Efimerida 
ton Syntakton Newspaper, 3 October 2014, available at  http://www.efsyn.gr/?p=240391  
Page  48 
 
 
detainee was 99 days (3.3 months).100 This included the examination at first and second 
instance, but not the judicial review of the case.  
If we take into account that return is not possible as long as an asylum claim is pending, then the 
detention of asylum-seekers entails both a loss of resources and a financial burden additional to 
the one of processing the claim. In terms of cost, the loss is not insignificant. For instance, mid 
2013-2014, 2,323 detainees applied for asylum and at least 1,187 claims received a first-instance 
decision by the new Asylum Service within 58 days.101 This means that EUR 1,101,536 was 
invested in detention with the aim of return, a process that could not take place either way 
while the asylum claim was pending.102 
Table 17. Asylum claims submitted by migrants in detention facilities 2008-2013103 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Asylum Claims 2,868 4,759 5,136 4,595 5,735 2,623 
*Data provided by the Greek Police, 1. April 2014 
Alternatives to Detention 
First Reception Centres- Screening Centres 
The concept of Screening Centres is relatively new. The Centres were introduced together with 
the First Reception Centres and they were purported to gradually replace the border guard 
stations and other unsuitable detention facilities Greece was using to receive and screen 
newcomers.104 Screening Centres are, thus, not detention centres in the strict sense of the 
term. They aim at carrying out identifications processes and establish the needs and status of 
a migrant. There are currently two screening centres on the islands of Samos and Chios. Both 
types of establishments opened their doors in the course of 2013.   
First Reception Centres aim at providing newcomers with some first aid (food, medical aid, 
information); new arrivals stay for an average of 12 days and in exceptional circumstances for 25 
days105. Their purpose is to identify vulnerable categories, offer first assistance and care, 
                                                          
100  Statistics between June 2013- August 2014, New Asylum Service; see also Report by the Campaign for Access 
to Asylum, October 2014 available at http://asylum-campaign.blogspot.gr  
101  58 days from moment of registration until issuance of first decision, Statistics of new Asylum Service. The 
figure 1,187 includes only substantial decisions and excludes inadmissible applications and resignations.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Police Reply to Eliamep, 1 April 2014 
104  See Commission Staff Working Document on the Assessment of the implementation of the Greek Action Plan 
on Asylum and Migration management, 2014, p. 5 
105  Police Reply to Eliamep, 28 January 2014 
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information on asylum and act as the first point of reference for the irregular arrival to the 
country.  There is currently one First-Reception Centre in Fylakio (Evros). On the islands, first 
reception services are currently provided by two Mobile Units.  
The establishment of both the First Reception Centre and the First Reception Mobile Units was 
supported financially by the External Borders Fund. The total EU funding of such infrastructural 
projects amounted approximately to EUR 9 million.106 Further financial support was also 
provided through the External Borders Fund emergency measures, in order to provide some 
additional targeted assistance to the actual reception/identification/screening procedures of 
irregular migrants by the FRC and the Mobile Units. There is a serious shortage, however, in 
covering extant needs. Within this context UNHCR has assumed a significant operational role by 
focusing on strategic entry points.107 Nonetheless, the allocated budget is indicative of the 
different weight placed on the facilities and the importance allocated to detention and the 
critical first reception. 108 
 
Table 18. Planned Constructions under Greece's 2013 revised National Action Plan109  
Item  Annual Running Cost Progress of Implementation 
First Reception 
Centres  
 x 4 
 
21 million 1 operative centre (240 places) 
In search of funding for the rest 
Pre-removal 
Centres 
x 9  
 
 
57 million 
6 operative centres (4,985 places) 
Funding secured for remaining 
constructions 
   
Open Accommodation  
Since detention is a measure of last resort, Greece is expected to establish open accommodation 
facilities to shelter irregular migrants. Open accommodation centres are currently primarily 
designed for unaccompanied minors, families and vulnerable categories (victims of torture). 
Some facilities are also open to adult women and one of those may also shelter men. Run in 
their majority by NGOs, the pre-condition for tenants is that they are registered asylum seekers.  
                                                          
106 Supra 90 
107 Interview with UNHCR Officer, 20 April 2014 
108 See Greek Police, Reply to Greek Ombudsman, 17 July 2013, available at  
http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/apanthsh-elas-19-07-13.pdf  
109 In its review of the Implementation of the National Action Plan, the Commission noted that “the first reception 
capacity continues to be in need of significant further financial and human resource investment”, see Commission Staff 
Working Document 2014,  p. 6 
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We suggest as an example the accommodation program of the NGO Praxis. The organization 
currently runs apartments that can host up to four people each. The total capacity is 130 
persons. The average cost of hosting a person ranges between 9-12 euros per day and this 
includes utilities and maintenance work (painting, new furniture, repair of electrical devices). 
Accommodation is of a temporary nature (6 months on average) while the person looks for 
employment and private accommodation. If necessary, the person may seek the assistance of 
social workers. The approach is holistic since it does not solely focus on financial assistance. And 
it is sustainable as the person eventually becomes self-sufficient and integrates back to society. 
The current capacity of analogous centres is as follows: 
 
Table 19. Capacity Open Accommodation/Shelters 
Item Capacity Funding 
Unaccompanied minors 313 • EEA Grants 
• ERF 
• National Resources 
Families 780 
TOTAL 1,093 
 
If we review this policy then open or semi-open accommodation centres offer a more viable 
solution, especially for asylum-seekers, vulnerable categories and/or migrants under assisted 
voluntary return programs pending their return. Following discussions with the Commission, 
Greece revised its strategy and agreed to increase the current capacity to 2,500 places by the 
end of 2014. Nonetheless, when compared to detention, the limited capacity of such shelters is 
reflective of the weight attached to the former. 
Thus a combination of first reception/screening and open or semi-open centres appears to 
offer equivalent or potentially better value for money, while being in line with national and 
European law. It is also more appropriate than detention for asylum-seekers and vulnerable 
categories of irregular migrants. 
Policy Recommendations 
1. Screening of individual cases: it is unnecessary to detain indiscriminately the irregular 
migrants that the authorities come across, in order to implement an effective migration and 
asylum policy. Asylum-seekers for instance, cannot be deported for as long as their claims are 
being examined; keeping them in detention during this period is not only inhuman but also very 
costly. There is thus an urgent need for individualized screening of all detained irregular 
migrants/asylum seekers. In addition, the capacity of first reception and screening centres 
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should be increased. European funds should be directed to this purpose as an important policy 
priority. 
2. Surveillance schemes alternative to detention. Pilot schemes have been tried in Belgium, 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom but also Australia and the USA. While state 
authorities have been often reluctant to adopt such schemes, the overall assessment is positive 
3. Caseworker scheme – investment in early legal advice: Irregular migrants, including asylum-
seekers, often rely on false information provided by the smugglers. Early legal advice, preferably 
through personal contact with an assigned caseworker, can result in quicker and more durable 
decisions, resulting in overall savings  
4. Investment in language courses: In many EU Member States, learning the native language is a 
priority. Not only does this cut down on the cost of translators, but it speeds up the 
administrative procedure, as the migrant is able to communicate in the context of daily 
interactions. In addition, it facilitates integration where regularization eventually takes place. 
5. Open/ semi-open accommodation: Asylum-seekers, families, vulnerable categories can be 
housed in open accommodations that are less costly, achieve higher standards and allow better 
integration of approved cases. 
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CHAPTER 4: RETURNS 
 
The most significant change in the aforementioned period was the investment in returns; a 
component of Greece's irregular migration control strategy which had been overlooked in 
previous years. In 2009, Greece issued 42% of the EU’s return decisions, but it only managed to 
carry out 8% of those since there was no program to promote and support voluntary return 
and reintegration. Furthermore, Greece experienced difficulties with the readmission of third-
country nationals, especially from Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
At a legislative level, the transposition of the Returns Directive introduced into Greek law the 
'returns' procedure, as opposed to mere expulsion. At a policy level, the IOM assumed the 
pivotal role of aiding Greece implement voluntary returns, in the course of 2012-2013, with the 
financial support of three different funding instruments (EEA Grants, Return Fund, UKBA 
funding). The IOM also facilitated the voluntary return of detained migrants, a policy which was 
seen as controversial and an indirect support of Greece's detention policy. Nonetheless, 
compared to the overall number of arrivals, there is still space to improve the rate of return.  
Readmission, Expulsion and Voluntary Returns 
Greek law currently foresees three ways in which a migrant may be removed from the country: 
(a) Readmission, applicable to irregular migrants seeking to cross the borders110 
(b) Expulsion, applicable to irregular migrants arrested upon entering the country111 
(c) Return process, applicable to irregular migrants who reside in the country irregularly.112 
A migrant who seeks to cross the border may be readmitted immediately by the Greek 
authorities to the country of transit. If readmission is not possible, then the migrant who is 
arrested crossing the Greek borders is issued an administrative expulsion order that orders 
him/her to leave the country normally within a time-frame of maximum 30 days. In cases where 
a migrant is arrested residing in the country irregularly, he/she is given a 'return decision' that 
orders him/her to leave the country within 7-30 days. In some cases this may be extended up to 
1 year.113  Should the irregular migrant not voluntarily depart within the foreseen period, he/she 
is then subject to forced removal.  
                                                          
110 Article 83 par. 2, Law 3386/2005 
111 Articles 76-83, Law 3386/2005 
112 Law 3907/2011 
113  The Expulsion of Irregular migrants is regulated by Articles 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82 and 83 Law of 3386/2005 
as amended by Law Nos  3448/06, 3536/07, 3613/07, 3649/08, 3731/08, 3772/09, 3801/09, 3838/2010, 3846/2010, 
3870/2010, 3875/2010, 3879/2010, 3900/2010, 3907/2011, 3938/2011, 4018/2011, 4061/2012, 4071/2012, 4075/2012, 
4115/2013, 4139/2013 and 4146/2013. (available at  
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Generalsecretariat_PopulationSC/general_directorate_migratation/diefthinsi_metanasteftikis_politik
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The physical removal of an irregular migrant, thus, may be carried out in four manners; (a) 
readmission, (b) forced return, (c) voluntary return, (d) assisted voluntary return. 
Readmission Agreements 
Readmission agreements are considered by the Greek authorities to be the most practical tool 
in the context of irregular migration management.114 Readmission, compared to 
returns/expulsions, is a bureaucratically simplified procedure carried out on the basis of inter-
State requests (provided the third country cooperates).115 The process primarily concerns 
migrants who have not yet been issued a expulsion order, and provided no criminal charges have 
been pressed against them by the Prosecutor. Contrary to other removal procedures, migrants 
are not served with an administrative or judicial expulsion decision or a return decision (see Art. 
77 Law N. 3386/2005, Arts. 21 and 30 Law N. 3907/2011).116 In the context of its irregular 
migration policy, Greece has signed readmission agreements amongst others with Turkey (2002), 
Albania (2004) and Pakistan (2010). 
The most successful re-admission agreement in practice is the one with Albania. The least 
successful has been the one with Turkey. By way of illustration, in the course of 2010, Greece 
requested the readmission of a total of 10,198 irregular migrants, of whom the Turkish 
authorities accepted 1,457. Eventually only 501 persons were returned. During the same year, 
48,177 Albanian migrants were returned through the readmission procedure. Greece has 
unsuccessfully pursued the completion of bilateral readmission agreements also with Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Bangladesh.117 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
hs/NOMOI/  ). The New Migration Code of 2014 has left the legislative framework regulating returns intact (see Article 
139). The return of an Irregular Migrant is regulated by Law 3907/2011. 
114 See Deputy Minister of Exterior, Parliamentary Reply of 28 June 2013, available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8134194.pdf  
115 See Council of the European Union, Council Recommendation of 24 July 1995 on the guiding principles to be 
followed in drawing up protocols on the implementation of readmission agreements a, Official Journal C274, 19 
September 1996, vailable at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31996Y0919(08)&from=EL      
116 See Police Reply to Eliamep, 24 June 2014 
117 See Deputy Minister of Exterior, Parliamentary Reply of 28 June 2013, available at 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8134194.pdf   
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Forced Returns 
Forced returns (executed expulsions) entail the physical removal of the irregular migrant 
despite his consent. A migrant who is forcibly returned is registered in the list of unwanted third 
country nationals.118  
 In cases where a migrant refuses to board the means of transport, his removal takes place with 
police escort. Interestingly enough, the safeguards foreseen by the Greek law119 in such cases 
concern only “the safe transfer, stay and return” of the police escorts and not of the migrant.  
Table 20. Apprehensions- Executed Expulsions 2008-2013 
Year Apprehensions Expulsions 
2008 146,337 20,555 
2009 126,145 20,342 
2010 132,524 17,340 
2011 99,368 8,741  
2012 76,878 6,798 
2013 43,002 8,780 
TOTAL 624,254 82,556 
 
According to law 3386/2005120, the cost of forced return is borne by the migrant. If the migrant 
does not possess the necessary resources, then the sum spent is considered a public 
expenditure. In the period 2008-2013, there was a sharp decrease in forced expulsions, 
particularly from 2011 onwards, attributable largely to the entry into force of the visa-
liberalization regime for Albanian nationals. 
Voluntary Returns/Assisted Voluntary Returns 
Greek Law does not specify in great detail the procedure in place for migrants who opt for 
voluntary return. In practice, anyone who wishes to return may apply to do so at any time.  
Applications for voluntary returns are in general addressed to the IOM and the Police, while 
assisted voluntary return is carried out by IOM. The procedure followed is as follows: 
                                                          
118 Articles 76-83 Law 3386/2005 which has remained in force under the new Migration Code, Law N. 4251/2014 
Article 139 par. 2 
119  Ibid. 
120  Ibid. 
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1. the migrant submits to the Attica Aliens Directorate an application for voluntary 
departure 
2. the police service registers the application and makes an entry in the Schengen database 
3. a return decision is issued without a detention decision and without a prohibition to 
enter the country 
4. the migrant is served with a “notice” which grants him/her 30 days to leave the country, 
within which the authorities arrange for the departure 
5. the authorities inform the migrant about the date of departure  
6. the migrant is transferred to the airport with a police car where the departure is fulfilled 
 
The cost of voluntary returns is currently covered by the EEA Grants, the UKBA and the European 
Returns Fund.  
The main advantage of voluntary return over forced return is that the migrant is not registered 
in the list of unwanted third-country nationals. The main difference between voluntary and 
assisted voluntary return is that migrants of the latter category also receive increased financial 
incentives to return to their home countries. Until June 2014, all adult irregular migrants that 
were voluntarily returned under the IOM program received 300 euros in 'pocket money'. From 
June 2014 onwards, this was increased to 400 euros.121 Migrants who participated in the 
voluntary return programs of the Greek police did not initially receive financial support, though 
the policy was recently revised. Additionally, in some cases the IOM provides financial support 
for reintegration to the country of origin. Financial assistance can reach 1,500 euros. The sum is 
not given directly to the person, but to the IOM local office in the country of origin which invests 
the sum in the integration of the returnee. This type of assistance is decided on an individual 
basis, according to the profile of the person and may include education, the purchase of a rig-
shaw or the start of a small business. The overall number of beneficiaries remains limited due to 
budgetary constraints; for instance, between July 2013 and June 2014, roughly 500 migrants 
received reintegration assistance. 
 
 
                                                          
121 Interview with IOM officer, 3 June 2014 
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Table 21. Statistics Apprehensions- Voluntary/Assisted Voluntary returns 
 
Year Apprehensions Voluntary/Assisted Voluntary Returns 
2008 146,337 -- 
2009 126,145 -- 
2010 132,524 337 
2011 99,368 2,607 
2012 76,878 11,526 
2013 43,002 9,962 
Total 624,254 24,432 
 
 
The available data also show that returns under the IOM are increasing in significance compared 
to voluntary returns operated by the Police. 
 
Figure 8. Annual Voluntary departures 2010-2013 IOM v. Police 
  
 
Source: Data provided by Greek Police on 1 April 2014 and by IOM 2 June 2014 
 
According to IOM, the top six nationalities voluntarily returning from 2010-2013 were: Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco and Georgia.  
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If we juxtapose the number of migrants who voluntarily returned in the period 2010-2013 
under the IOM program and the number of apprehensions during the same period122, then the 
outcome looks as follows:  
 
Table. 22 Rate of Voluntary Returns among the Top Nationalities Apprehended 2010-2013 
 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Albania 15389 0% 10602 0% 11733 0% 50175 0% 
Syria 8517 0% 7927 0.05% 1522 0% 851 2% 
Afghanist
an 
6412 11% 16584 6.9% 28528 0.7% 28299 0.4% 
Pakistan 3982 124% 11136 34% 19975 1% 8830 1% 
Banglade
sh 
1524 94% 7863 11% 5416 0.9% 3264 0.5% 
Somalia 1004 0% 1765 0% 2238 0% 6525 0% 
Eritrea 726 0.1% 923 0% 1172 0% 1628 0% 
Iraq 700 44% 2212 7% 2863 3% 4968 0.6% 
Georgia 568 71% 793 6% 879 0% 1456 0% 
Palestine 469 0% 1718 0% 2065 0% 7561 0% 
Algeria 443 0.4% 4606 0.04% 5398 0.03% 7336 0% 
Morocco 442 55% 2207 13% 3405 1% 1645 0.3% 
Congo 72 4% 631 1% 1855 0.05% 90 0% 
Source: www.astynomia.gr and data provided by IOM, 2 June 2014 
 
The figures of 2012-2013 show that voluntary returns were particularly attractive for citizens of 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Georgia and Morocco.  In 2013, voluntary returns corresponded to more 
than half of the annual apprehensions among those nationalities. The case of Pakistan is of 
special interest here. In 2013 for example, the overall number of Pakistanis who participated in 
voluntary return programs was higher than the total number of apprehensions, though it should 
be pointed out that those returned were not necessarily apprehended in the same year.  Albania 
                                                          
122  The annual number of apprehensions includes both newcomers and migrants residing irregularly in the 
country.  
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on the other hand, does not have a voluntary return program with IOM since the geographical 
nearness of the country makes individual voluntary return feasible.  
It can be argued that voluntary return programs can be attractive for economic migrants 
originating from safe third countries, though, as to be expected, they are not an option for 
asylum seekers and forced migrants.  
 In terms of cost, with the exception of Albania, where migrants are returned by bus, forced 
removal of third country nationals normally takes place through charter flights or via regular 
flights (with or without escort).  The cost of a forced return via charter flight is 1486,75 euros 
and via reservations in regular airlines 404,7 euros.123  
Unsurprisingly, the latter are preferred. In 2010, 1,145 nationals were returned via charter flights 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan primarily. During the same period, three times more migrants (4,238 
migrants) were returned via regular flights. The top five nationalities were Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and China.124 
The cost of voluntary return flights is not precisely known, since neither the police nor the IOM 
were able to provide conclusive answers. Between mid 2010- mid 2012 the average cost of 
returns operated under the Returns Fund was estimated at 1,104 euros per return.125 This would 
include the financial assistance of 300 euros. If we divide the funding received by the IOM under 
the EEA Grants against the number of persons returned, then the average cost emerges as 1,250 
euros per return.  However, this is an estimated sum. The precise figure will vary according to 
the country of origin and depending on the amount of financial assistance provided to 
reintegrate the migrant to his/her home country.  
Assessing the cost-effectiveness 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the available data indicate that forced return via charter flight is 
the most expensive type of return, both in terms of cost and in terms of human resources 
deployed; voluntary returns are less costly, bureaucratically easier to carry out 126 and 
potentially carry more sustainable results, since the migrant opted to return and has, thus, has 
fewer incentives to return to Europe again.  
 
                                                          
123 Calculated on the basis of funding received divided by returns operated. See Ministry of Citizen Protection, 
Parliamentary Reply of 1 December 2012, available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-
ad6a-476a34d732bd/7853135.pdf  
124 See Ministry of Citizen Protection, Annual Implementation Report to European Return Fund 2010 
125  fn. 123 
126 See also http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/7853135.pdf  ; 
interview with Head of Elliniko Pre-Removal Centre, 10 April 2014 
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One could argue that the same cannot be said for forced returns or voluntary returns out of 
detention facilities.  In fact, using detention as means of extracting consent to return, can be 
counter-productive for the sustainability of return; a migrant who 'consents' in order to escape 
detention is more likely to return, compared to someone who took a conscious decision, 
without the pressure of incarceration. Nonetheless, the policy is too recent to draw concrete 
conclusions regarding sustainability.  
 
In line with this reasoning, cost-effectiveness would require that distribution prioritizes 
voluntary returns. Between 2008 and 2013, Greece received almost 130 million euros under the 
Return Fund. However, only 50% of this allocation was earmarked for the implementation of 
actual returns, as 32% was consumed in detention facilities. Earlier annual programs focused 
mostly on forced returns, while in later years allocation to both voluntary and forced returns was 
almost equal. Finally, cost-effectiveness would also require that efforts concentrate on migrants 
for whom return is a feasible option, in view of the situation in the country of origin. In this 
sense, it can be misleading to review the cost-effectiveness of Greece's voluntary return policy 
only in absolute numbers.  
Policy Recommendations 
 
1. Distribution of funding towards voluntary returns: There is space for further allocation of 
funding in the context of voluntary returns. If the authorities reduce detention places, and 
instead increase the budget of voluntary and assisted voluntary returns, they may achieve more 
cost-effective results. In light of the Greek crisis and the difficulty in finding employment in 
Greece, economic migrants may be more willing to make use of this option.  
2. Expansion of return counseling programs: Information about return programs should be 
widely disseminated. Studies show that specific categories of persons (e.g. Families with 
children) are more likely to agree to return to their home countries, if properly informed of the 
option.   
3. Expansion of assisted voluntary return programs: The data provided by IOM demonstrate 
that voluntary return programs are particularly successful among nationalities with an economic 
profile and relatively safe conditions in their home country. It would therefore be more effective 
to expand programs of assisted voluntary returns towards categories of migrants who enter 
Greece for pure economic reasons and expand the reintegration schemes.  
4. Seasonal work agreements: The Greek authorities may consider not only the option of 
bilateral agreements to secure the readmission, but also bilateral agreements of seasonal work. 
The idea then would be that these workers maintain residence in the third country but come 
every year for work. In fact the EU is moving into this direction with the preparation of a 
Page  60 
 
 
Seasonal Workers Directive.127 Greece is not a stranger to this type of agreements, as they have 
been successfully applied with Egypt, Bulgaria and Albania.128 This would provide an economic 
incentive to countries of origin for cooperation in the field of readmission and reduce the 
number of irregular arrivals for work-related reasons, tackling thus irregular migration at its 
source. 
 
                                                          
127  See Proposition of Directive on common entry and residence conditions for third country seasonal workers as 
in “Commissioner Malstrom welcomes agreement on migrant seasonal workers”, Brussels, 29 October 2013, available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-941_en.htm  
128   See Global Forum on Migration and Development, “Compendium of Good Practice Policy Elemnts in Bilateral 
Temporary Labour Arrangements”, 2 December 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/50aa5cfc9.pdf  
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CHAPTER 5: KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY MAKERS 
There is no doubt, that in recent years Greece has undertaken a serious effort to tackle irregular 
migration. The purpose of this study has not been to challenge the Greek and consequently the 
EU's policy objectives altogether but rather accept the current policy objectives as granted and 
review the manner in which the authorities sought to achieve them. The MIDAS project solely 
explored the financial dimension of the Greek migration policy and has sought to put forward 
policy recommendations in line with international human rights law that will benefit both 
migrants and the host society. 
The main disadvantage in Greece's approach towards irregular migration is the sweeping 
manner in which it designs and applies its policies. Their indiscriminate application is not cost 
effective firstly because it creates unnecessary expenditures and secondly because it seeks to 
maximize the effectiveness of few tools of supposed strategic significance, largely ignoring the 
complexities of contemporary migratory flows. What is needed instead is a more nuanced and 
holistic approach, as Greece had envisioned in the original design laid out in the National Action 
Plan. The Conclusions summarize here our policy recommendations which are meant to aid 
Greece make better use of its budget and enhance its application: 
 
• Awareness-raising campaigns: Greece should invest in awareness-campaigning. For 
instance, Greece can appoint migration officers at diplomatic delegations abroad and 
distribute through NGOs both in Greece and abroad film documentaries. There is often 
little awareness among prospective irregular migrants before starting their journey that 
they can hardly hope to regularize their stay and legitimately work in Europe. 
• More comprehensive and accurate Data collection to allow better evaluation of 
policies: It is important that more accurate data are kept to monitor the final outcomes 
of Greece’s policies, in particular in the context of apprehension and detention.  
• Investment in forged documents identification (will cut down time during round up 
operations). Under the current scheme, in the course of a round up operation all 
migrants are gathered together, transferred to police headquarters and their documents 
are checked there. This is a time-consuming and inefficient practice for both the people 
checked and the officers involved. Funds could be invested in forged documentation 
technology.  
• Re-distribution of funds in training and screening: There is space to distribute funds in 
screening and linguistic training of officers so that identification becomes faster. This 
would cut down on the time of the operation and save resources which could be spent 
elsewhere (e.g. regular police duties) 
• Screening of individual cases: it is unnecessary to detain indiscriminately irregular 
migrants, since on top of everything else it results in unnecessary expenditures. Asylum-
seekers for instance, cannot be deported for as long as their claims are being examined; 
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keeping them in detention during this period is not only inhuman but also very costly. 
There is thus an urgent need for individualized screening of all detained irregular 
migrants/asylum seekers. In addition, the capacity of first reception and screening 
centres should be increased. European funds should be directed to this purpose as an 
important policy priority.  
• Surveillance schemes alternative to detention. Pilot schemes have been tried in 
Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom but also Australia and the USA. 
While state authorities have been often reluctant to adopt such schemes, the overall 
assessment is positive. 
• Caseworker scheme – Investment in early legal advice: Early legal advice, preferably 
through personal contact with an assigned caseworker, can result in quicker and more 
durable decisions, resulting in overall savings  
• Investment in language courses: : In many EU Member States, teaching to an irregular 
migrant the national language is a priority. Not only does this cut down on the cost of 
translators, but it also speeds up the administrative procedure, as the migrant is able to 
communicate in the context of daily interactions. In addition, it facilitates integration in 
cases where regularization eventually takes place. Greece could adopt such measures 
and seek the financial support of the European Refugee and the European Return Fund 
rather than mainly targeting the External Border fund’s assistance. 
• Open/ semi-open accommodations/First Reception:  A combination of first 
reception/screening and open or semi-open centres appears to offer equivalent or 
actually better value for money, is in line with national and European law, and certainly 
is more appropriate than detention for asylum-seekers and vulnerable categories of 
irregular migrants. 
• Distribution of funding towards voluntary returns and assisted voluntary returns: 
There is space for distribution of funding in the context of voluntary returns, which may 
achieve more cost-effective results both in terms of time-frame (realization), available 
budget and sustainability. In view of the Greek crisis and the difficulty in finding 
employment in Greece, migrants may be more willing to make use of this option.  
• Expansion of return counseling programs: Information about return programs should 
be wider disseminated. Studies show that specific categories of persons (e.g. Families 
with children) are more likely to agree to return to their home countries.  
• Seasonal work agreements: The Greek authorities may consider not only the option of 
bilateral agreements to secure the readmission, but also bilateral agreements of 
seasonal work. Greece has significant experience with such successful agreements with 
Egypt, Bulgaria and Albania. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Table 1. Success rate of “Return Decision” 
Year Apprehensions ‘Return Decisions’ 
issued 
Returns 
Executed 
Success Rate  
2008 146,337 90,853 22,703 25% 
2009 126,145 77,005 21,655 28% 
2010 132,524 98,201 19,100 19.4% 
2011 99,368 97,338 13,253 13.6% 
2012 76,878 85,163 20,473 24% 
2013 43,002 42,851 16,490 38% 
Total 624,254 491,411 113,674 24.5% 
 
 
Figure 1. Readmissions v. Forced Expulsions 2008-2013 
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Table 2. Expulsions- Executed Returns 2008-2013 
Year Apprehensions Executed returns Actual returns v. Annual 
Apprehensions 
2008 146,337 22,703 15.5% 
2009 126,145 21,655 17% 
2010 132,524 19,100 14.4% 
2011 99,368 13,253 13% 
2012 76,878 20,473 26.6% 
2013 43,002 16,490 38% 
Total 624,254 113,674 20.7% 
 
 
Table 3. Apprehensions- Return Decisions- Returns -Readmission 2008-2013 
Year Apprehensions ‘Return Decisions 
issued 
Returns 
executed 
Readmissions 
2008 146,337 90,853 22,703 48,252 
2009 126,145 77,005 21,655 43,085 
2010 132,524 98,201 19,100 35,129 
2011 99,368 97,338 13,253 5,922 
2012 76,878 85,163 20,473 4,759 
2013 43,002 42,851 16,490 7,533 
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Figure 2. Forced returns (Expulsions) v. voluntary returns 
 
 
Figure 3.  Readmissions- Voluntary Returns- Executed Expulsions 
 
Page  66 
 
 
Table 6. Capacity Pre-Removal Centres- Actual Number of Detainees 
Facility 2012 2013 Total 
Amygdaleza 2,348 3,742 6,090 
Komotini 1,017 1,506 2,523 
Xanthi 609 731 1,340 
Paranesti 311 686 997 
Corinth 1,195 1,432 2627 
Fylakio 23,266 502 23,768 
TOTAL 28,746 8,599 37,345 
 
 
Table 7. Special Holding Facilities- Actual Number of Detainees 
Facility  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total  
P.Ralli 7669 6223 5880 5570 6680 4781 36,803 
Amygdaleza 
Minors  
859 750 572 311 336 244 3,072 
Aspropyrgos 2592 2053 2386 1320 1503 304 10,158 
Elliniko- Palaia  --- --- 1703 557 593 37 2,890 
Elliniko- Nea 2183 1578 1919 942 1250 956 8,828 
Peiraius 804 790 602 59 --- --- 2,255 
Amarousio 350 571 497 398 340 434 2,590 
TOTAL  14,817 11,965 13,559 9,157 10,702 6,756 66,956 
 
 
Table 8. Programmed Costs of Pre-Removal Centres under revised National Action Plan 2013 
Facility Construction Costs Running costs per  year 
Amygdaleza 3,000,000 10,500,000 
Corinth 2,100,000 10,500,000 
Ritsona 4,600,000 4,200,000 
Karoti 4,600,000 3,800,000 
Komotini 1,800,000 3,800,000 
Xanthi 1,000,000 3,400,000 
Parenesti 5,800,000 6,800,000 
Western Macedonia 10,000,000 11,400,000 
Mytilene 5,700,000 3,400,000 
TOTAL 38,600,000 57,800,000 
 
